This whole (web-)page of my writings belongs to my person, i.e., © Terje Lea 2009 - 2011. Make no mistake about it!
Update: 20.03.2011.
By Terje Lea, 2009-2011 as Aetixintro in forums.philosophyforums.com and forum.philosophynow.org
Note! These time-records may be inaccurate. They may be UTC, UTC +1 or other time-records, especially from Philosophyforums as they're presented there. You should therefore pay attention to this when you look for the posts on these two sites as I've been inconsistent on copying time-records of being logged in (usually CET) or not (default for the site).
Links to the various arguments. Please click the first letter.
Religion is stupid! Is it?
Religion Negative or Religion
Searle's Chinese Room Argument on Its Head
Performative Utterances and Scientific Papers
Causation - Is it worth it? Outlook on Causation.
What are your philosophical positions? / This argument is last updated!
Programming a Syntactic "Semantic" Machine - Is it feasible?
A Solution to the Problem of Evil - A Theodicy
The Encumbrance Theory of Intelligence (ETI) - Philosophy of Psychology?
A Possible Explanation of Identity - Is this any good to the problems of Identity?
An Attack on Indexicality
An Argument in Favour of Abortion
Demarcation Against Religion - Is It In Vain?
Marilyn McCord Adams on Evil - Pessimism Or Optimism, Believer Or Not
Objectivity of the Senses - Building A Better Metaphysics
Friend and foe philosophers
Standards of Business Practice - Facilitation of Corruption Charges to Prevent Greed on Wall Street and Elsewhere
Comment on Companions in Guilt - Arguments for Ethical Objectivity - By Hallvard Lillehammer
Objection to Berkeley's Idealism
The Democratic View of the Miracles of Angels
Are emotions rational?
Non-Dogmatic Intelligent Design - The Minimum Requirements to Constitute "Godliness"
Due Process, Technology, and the Future
Logic of Ethics
Rephrasing Ought in a Sentence - Ought-less Language
Objection to Any Ambiguity of Moral Language
The Logic of Free Will
Can God know what it is like to ride a bike? - An argument for the nonexistence of God from the incompatibility of attributes
Pro and Con Arguments of (Assisted) Suicide
Comment on Goodness - Plain perception!
The square circle? Alternation like Riemann!
Scientific Explanation of Person
The Fountain - Obliteration of controversy by functionalism.
The Worth of Philosophy
The duplication of person - Personal Identity
The Turing Test
Approaches to Sets
Laws and Descriptions
Argument Against Stupidity or Ethical Ignorance
Wittgenstein's Beetle Box
Epistemology of Logics
The Conditions for Abolishment of Ethics as a Philosophical Discipline
Gravestone for Communism (until Utopia)
Philosophy as Science - Now Free Linguistic Science!
On the Objection of Proving the Negative
A Reply to An Idea of Subjectivity
Indeterminacy of Quine
On the Question of Science - An Important Distinction
On the Question of Torture
On the Question of Freedom and Control
A Practical Guide to Ethics: The Pocket and Cell Theory
My View on a Theory of Everything
The Analytic-Synthetic Divide - Against Quine and His Two Dogmas
General Theory of Arts Demarcation
Note: The most newly created argument is always placed lowest on the page.
Religion is stupid! Is it?
Posted 03/05/09 - 04:28 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
There are many strong opinions on religion, but I say that
to argue for or against dogmatic religious beliefs in the Philosophy of Religion thread is stupid!
Posted 03/05/09 - 05:11 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I speak into your ears and no matter how hard or well I try, there is no chance to change your mind!
Posted 03/05/09 - 05:42 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Let me begin with something like: it is better to have faith, belief, in waking up after death than to admit defeat to death even before it has happened!
Posted 03/05/09 - 05:57 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I think it takes away the essential part of the argument to be dogmatic. Dogmatic thoughts are generally characterised by the absence of the reasonable. You can try to make up the sense of, for example, Jesus all you want, but in history, Jesus is more holes than substance.
So if you are a Christian, you can now begin to argue why you believe in Jesus Christ, God's son, a part of the trinity. There is a good chance we disagree on Jesus. It is funny, I must say, if you kill someone while warding off an attack, it may be a sin, but if you happen to kill the presumably best person in the world, God's son, who must be heavenly good, you get redemption. Normally, they torture you before they let you die for an act like that. But, hey, something beyond natural doesn't exist.
Posted 03/07/09 - 03:23 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I have the sense that most dogmatic religious beliefs are taken from some kind of authority. Like when the boy says he believes in the bible because his father has used to read him bedtime stories from it.
I think the Philosophy of Religion is about the _search_ for answers in that matter. I have wanted to make the separation of Philosophy of Religion and Religion an explicit one. I understand if people are having existential problems when they have received their dogmatic religious beliefs from authority.
Posted 03/07/09 - 06:47 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Isn't it somewhat extreme to write "the importance is on *being* in a school of fish, not which direction they are collectively swimming". It reads like people are just social animals, not caring for the content, but for the social play. There are many social arenas to evolve in. I believe when people are explicitly part of something, a genuine belief follows with it.
Religion Negative or Religion
Posted 03/05/09 - 04:43 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Now, one picks up a hammer and nails a nail into some wood. This is reality. It is the truth that one is using a hammer and nails a nail. To deny this, is foolish.
In the future, some time, in an advanced position of science, one faces the Ultimate Explanation, if one ever gets there.
This Ultimate Explanation is a result of tedious work of conventional science, call it Religion Negative or Atheism, or the Ultimate Explanation is extra-natural in nature and approached accordingly, call it Religion or God or ID, it really doesn't matter.
Still in the future, facing the Ultimate Explanation, I suggest one picks up the hammer and acknowledge that this is the reality, this is the truth. To deny this, is foolish.
Now again, one should respect the belief of the other, because either way one isn't scientifically justified. If religion can be science, it will!
Still in the moment, one is facing death and simply dies and the other is facing death and meets the failure or success of one's belief.
Posted 03/07/09 - 03:11 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Possibly: Truth is religion to you, I guess from what you say. To me, facts necessarily represent truth. Otherwise the word, truth, is meaningless. I think one has to infer that truth must have the use to describe the conceptual life-world as a status report of conditions as we understand it at the present moment.
I take it you don't use the word, truth, very much except in referring to others who use it. Have you read Paul Horwich, Truth, 1998? I'm in sympathy with his minimal theory. Yet there are social facts and man-made objects, that are very much fixed in the human understanding. Even if we go back 2000 years, the status of these facts haven't changed much and as with logic, I think the status will never change or have the possibility to change.
Perhaps we agree on confirmation and falsification instead?
Posted 03/07/09 - 06:39 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I identify 2 outer bounds of a spectrum. I'm happy about the "various degrees of skepticism and socialization". I'm not stuck in any era, I just live like anyone else.
Posted 03/08/09 - 02:11 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I find that superstition, organized practice, polytheism, monotheism, metaphysical beliefs (religious ones) and theism are all variations of religious beliefs in a broad sense. Consequently, naturalism, realism and atheism are variations of non-religious beliefs. It is striking that science is so predominant in the developed world and the modern age. The future may hold a general "scientism" with or without metaphysical entities, I suspect. It may be that as the world population turns to science as answers to the most pressing, imminent daily questions, religion recedes to an ever smaller corner of the mind. So the scientists may have their Allah, Yahweh, God or whatever or none at all in their lives, but generally, science is the method of inquiry of the life-worlds and the explanation of nature in them.
I strongly believe that dogmatic strands of religions are facing the certain death and I say "Good riddance".
Searle's Chinese Room Argument on Its Head
Posted: Tue Mar 17, 2009 9:49 am; forum.philosophynow.org
It is funny, though, that if you turn Searle's [Chinese Room] argument on its head, it can be a nice qualia argument in so far as the person in the room learning Chinese in this occasion, can show the genuine character of a human distinctly apart from a computer. [One needs to hypothesise that this person has all the supplies necessary and as being hypothetical as Mary, the scientist in The Knowledge Argument.]
Performative Utterances and Scientific Papers
Posted 04/28/09 - 09:38 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
It seems to me that while the power of Frege's On Sense and Nominatum and Grice's Meaning is well retained in the context of scientific papers, this is not the case with the argument of J. L. Austin when he launches the attack on classical meaning theory by Performative Utterances. The power of pragmatics just dwindle to virtually nothing if you are to consider it in relation to scientific papers. Scientific papers are usually exhaustive in all sorts of manners and I find this is particular true in contexts, ie. outside factors that may play a role in the experiment. This is just a first thought and I'm wondering what you think? If one is scientific in one's approach to daily communication, is it possible to clear most misunderstandings?
Posted 04/28/09 - 11:25 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
In Austin's own words from the Performative Utterances, p. 144-145 in The Philosophy of Language, Martinich, 5.ed:
Quote: "What we need besides the old doctrine about meanings is a new doctrine about all the possible forces of utterances, towards the discovery of which our proposed list of explicit performative verbs would be a very great help; and then, going on from there, an investigation of the various terms of appraisal that we use in discussing speech-acts of this, that, or the other precise kind - orders, warnings, and the like."
Really, it may be necessary to read the whole thing to get it, but there you have some of it. Have you tried Wikipedia or Google?
Posted 04/29/09 - 01:34 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
There is no speech-act in a scientific paper. Just in case you say there is, this speech-act has no context outside the scientific paper. Therefore, there really is no impact of Austin in the scientific paper that yield any worth to Austin's theory and the semantics is thereby seized wholly, again, by the classical theory of meaning, nullifying Austin. Is this nothing? I guess some people like to protest to what I'm saying and I'm interested in exactly what this is.
Can I also return the question? Why is there no problem? Have I missed something that makes me think I have a point?
Posted 04/29/09 - 10:23 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I don't think you answer what I'm asking. Can we agree that Austin's argument is more appealling in the daily life than in a given scientific paper? Maybe, I just speculate, Austin has been thinking about the usual life of people while Frege and Grice are caught up in their scientific environment, thus the given angles in the field. Others, what do you say?
Posted 04/29/09 - 10:50 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I don't think it's a wrongful assertion to say that the language in a scientific paper is more elaborate and exhaustive in regard to coincidences and the rest than the very daily life where people have fun with ambiguities and suffer the misunderstandings.
Posted 04/29/09 - 11:11 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
If I don't think it follows, I guess I wouldn't write it, don't you think? I think it follows directly from post #1 (Posted 04/28/09 - 09:38 PM).
Posted 04/30/09 - 11:52 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Thanks for your response. The object of truth is more obvious in scientific papers as that is it's main contribution. The functions of the speech-acts you mention are auxiliary as they essentially only help continuing enterprise of science. The pragmatics is reduced to an addendum to semantics once again.
Posted 05/01/09 - 12:00 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Why don't you make an account of what you think I argue and I'll see if I can make it up? You understand that this is about whether pragmatism or classical meaning theory is the most important in semantics? I write that in the limited view of only scientific papers, you find classical meaning theory the most important. Well... we'll see!
Causation - Is it worth it? Outlook on Causation.
Posted 06/29/09 - 12:39 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Causation - Is there any philosophical point in it?
You know, you have Causation with its concepts of cause and effect. I really think I agree to some extent with Hume on the issue. Say we issue causation in words and leave it to the sciences to describe it. If we are to find causation in itself, what do we expect from it? It seems strange to me that one is supposed to account for causation in metaphysics, the philosophical sense. When I think about it, I find the solution is to leave it to the sciences which do in fact describe nature, something that also includes the nature's workings. This is not a negative attitude to the philosophical investigation of causation as such, but there may be a more limited answer to it than we expect.
We have causation in biological, physical, psychological, and chemical systems. So how is it supposed to be uniform? I remember reading something about the surprise and slight shock of people a long time ago when they have learned about Action From A Distance, ie. gravitation. That is to say, I think causation lies entirely within the sciences. To contemplate causation is to contemplate every science in its potential and structure. This is final! I'll never say another word on Causation. Maybe I'll be back on this thread to give a better outline.
There is a book called Causation and Explanation by Stathis Psillos, but I'm sorry to say I've not read it.
What are your thoughts on Causation? What is your opinion on my writing? Cheers!
Posted 06/29/09 - 03:48 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I say that describing causation should be done mainly by the sciences ie. laws, explanations, correlations etc. When one considers this, I think there is little left to do for philosophy in describing causation. Do you disagree with this?
I have mentioned Hume and a book. You have no references from where I can understand your angle. Please, do you have any references of what you write?
My emotions are subsumed under my rational mind and I find justification to be the most rational activity of all.
I also think there's a philosophical point in causation, but that's not the issue and certainly not the emotions connected with it all. I'm really interested in your philosophical viewpoint of causation.
I find causation to be described in a fragmented way after the science has been carried out. It's therefore my reasoning that description of causation gives little to the sciences nowadays. The question is whether the sciences can be fine all on their own in this regard.
Isn't the philosophical reasoning concerning causation falling short in its contribution? Maybe it'll be worthwhile to track the history of causation, but my best guess is that science will provide the revolution to causation because it has a broader intake to its approach on analysis.
Everyone,
What are your thoughts on Causation? What is your opinion on my writing? Please, be to the point. References are highly appreciated. You don't need to write with the feelings on the outside of your skin. Will there come anything out of the speculation on causation? To what extent is that speculation precise and effective? You are invited to include your view on Hume's writing on the subject.
What are your philosophical positions?
Posted 06/30/09 - 06:21 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Here are mine:
Ethics: Kantian (Neo-Kantian), Deontologist, Moral Realist, Ethical Objectivist, I'll include Cognitivist also so that it doesn't escape in it all (Thanks, kNoctis!)
Philosophy of Language: Artificial Language Philosopher, De Dicto - Propositional - Philosopher, Gricean in meaning theory
Epistemology: Foundherentist (Foundationalism by photons and other quants, you can also add time and space to this, although, by Smolin, I don't bother to support more than 4 dimensions, 3 space and 1 time) and Internalist Externalist Compatibilist
Philosophy of Science: Scientific Realist, Fallback strategy to heuristic Instrumentalism and Operationalism which both include Conventionalism, Formally: Phenomenologist
Metaphysics: Interactionist, Solipsist and Quietist (there's a problem relating to the status of reality. I believe in God, being a deist, status of the mind effecting matter, the brain, taking part in the kingdom of ideas, and so on. I'd really like to put Realism in here, but I find it impossible because it's likely to cut me short), Free Will Philosopher, Truth Realist, Universalism and Particularism Compatibilist
Philosophy of Mind: Reductionist/Substance Dualist (It depends on the development of Standard Model in Physics)
Logics: Logical Realist
Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematical Realist
Philosophy of Politics: Utopian, Activist, Welfare-Capitalist, Conservative
Philosophy of Religion: Scientific Deist
Philosophy of Aesthetics: Kantian
Posted 07/03/09 - 04:21 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I believe Utopia to be of only one possibility, namely the one less of war, less of crime, less of immorality, less of insanity, perfect really, at least as good as it gets when it's human. Therefore, I'm a believer in Earthly Heaven and Divine Heaven, God's "stomach". In Phil. of Politics I find Jürgen Habermas to be a strikingly fine example of a philosopher.
BTW, is it a position in Philosophy of Religion to be a Deist? You may check me off as a Deist! Edit: Let me correct this to Scientific Deist. You may have seen it coming. I don't put to much into the terms of "immanent" or "transcendent". From Wikipedia, I now know this is a valid position in Philosophy of Religion. I'm though very relaxed to it. I think it may be possible to get to know God, to perceive God, to conceptualise God correctly by the mind, and I think it's possible to know the extent of God, God's nature, in this universe. This seems to rule out the conventional "immanent" and "transcendent". Like I care... In thinking about it further, hmmm..., Scientific Thedeist... ach! It may sound rather tedious...
A while back, I've come upon a striking description by I. Kant in his Critique of Judgment so since then I've been a Kantian in the field of Philosophy of Aesthetics.
Posted Sep 20, 2009 - 10:59 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I've been looking at Philosophy of Mathematics and I find that Mathematical Realism suits me nicely.
It may be that it follows PoM, but so be it. In Logics, I'm a Logical Realist. Remark: These positions are the initial ones and I don't have any comprehensive knowledge of these two fields. This may make these choices seem irrational, but I've made an attempt to solve the Problem of Induction and this attempt propels me into these positions. The "Solution" is here: http://forums.philosophyforums.com...ew-on-induction-36894.html.
Edit: I've been thinking some of "Moral Realism". Is it possible that morality is expressed in physics? That morality has an inner foundation in physical realities. I'm just wondering about and it may seem stupid to a lot of people. If there is a physical foundation for morality, I'm just speculating here, then I'm a Moral Realist, whatever it means in the literature.
[Edit:] Metaphysics: Solipsist.
(Edited by Aetixintro on Feb 21, 2010 - 2:54 AM. Reason: added information)
Posted: Thu May 13, 2010 3:26 am; forum.philosophynow.org
I've added today, along with these former positions, that I still hold, Free Will Philosopher and De Dicto - Propositional - Philosopher.
It may be unnecessary to say that I encourage people to find their own ways in the philosophical landscape as a way to keep track of one's own thinking. Cheers!
Posted: Sun Jun 06, 2010 1:46 pm UTC; forum.philosophynow.org
I'd like to add a position to Epistemology: Internalist Externalist Compatibilist!
I also continuously update the first post accordingly! I note that few replies deal with the traditional concepts of positions in philosophy. While I don't really care what position people like to have, I'd like to say that bracing oneself against the more established concepts can be more challenging than just to give a rhetoric account of one's view.
Posted: Tue Jun 22, 2010 7:36 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I also have a fallback strategy in Philosophy of Science to heuristic Instrumentalism and Operationalism which both include Conventionalism, I think. While this fallback strategy doesn't touch upon my Scientific Realism, I fall back when I think I'm stuck and yet find there's important description to do that may have a role in future research! This description can also bring education to the general public and leave it to them to make up their minds.
Posted: Sun Aug 15, 2010 11:32 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I add another position today, Truth Realism, in light of my writing on Truth (metaphysics) both here and on my website.
Maybe I should have added it some time ago, but at least I do it now. Previously, I've seen this as unimportant, but I think I understand people's definite wishes for clear-cut standing on this issue in particular as well as others.
[Edit, 16.08.2010:] Universalism and Particularism Compatibilist, being possible to see a group of obviously equal looking objects with no significant differences and also seeing the unique instances like people one by one. I think there are situations where you are faced with a group of objects that you name for this group and similarly for single objects that you may eventually group together. [End of edit.]
Posted: Fri Feb 25, 2011 9:47 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I have a new position to add:
Philosophy of Language: Gricean with respects to the meaning theory!
As you now get to know, I still work on the list and I continue to encourage you to do this as well!
Posted: Sun Mar 20, 2011 7:58 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Formally [by my own position], I see now that there's a paper in the Mind Journal that concerns Phenomenology and I think this is good!
Now the actual formality of mine is that I follow Phenomenology in Philosophy of Science insofar as this has any use. Thus this phenomenology of mine is a mere formal point! It would be backward to suggest that people should not investigate unknown phenomena and research these so they get a scientific description.
Also for Epistemology: I've come to the (now perhaps common) position that I've shifted to Foundherentist because I now see the photons and other quants as basic constituents of nature and thus there is a definite Foundation in nature! You can also add time and space to this, although, by Smolin, I don't bother to support more than 4 dimensions, 3 space and 1 time.
Programming a Syntactic "Semantic" Machine - Is it feasible?
Posted 07/04/09 - 02:17 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
With this thread, I want to throw in a vote for those programmers, perhaps also myself, who are aggressive on the approach to emulate the human capacity for semantic reasoning. This may be seen as a criticism of Searle's philosophy so I therefore choose to post it in the Philosophy of Language section as opposed to the Logic section. In a sense, this represents an analysis, necessarily perhaps, of semantics. For now the idea looks like an alien. I'll try to make it more clear as we go of the direction I think this idea takes us. It's inherent in this position that semantics may be expressible in syntactics. I don't know the contemporary status of this, but I have the feeling I'll be attacked and that it'll be exciting.
As this may be seen as a money-activity, I'll make the answers rather limited as I don't want to throw in so much resources in doing significant parts of the job. I'll try to argue for the possibility in principle and I don't want people to hold anything back. Of course, if you feel that your efforts are more useful in your daily (programming) work, I don't blame you.
I hope we can discuss this and see if the position breaks down or builds up. As before, I'll be back with more. I've come to this idea just a short while ago so I hope you bear with me. Cheers!
Posted 07/04/09 - 04:30 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
When I look up "emulate" on Dictionary.com it returns, among several, "imitate" and "model". First, I like to be very careful with such words as "understanding" and "comprehension". I suggest we look at these two words and give it proper analysis. For a starter, you may be interested in the Raven Paradox. There's something here: http://t-lea.net/philosophical_notes.html. Two other words I stumble upon are "assimilation" and "association". I see quite quickly that the programming requires "open ended items" as intakes of data sources. I also find the objects may be programmed with qualities so if one focuses on qualities and aspects with the objects of programming, one may take one step ahead in the analysis. The objective must be to create a program that returns suggestions on data from its sensors, a kind of guessing machine.
I think there's missing an analysis of "semantic reasoning" (SR). When I consider something SR, what does that mean? What happens in my brain when I SR? Is it in fundamental opposition to "syntactic reasoning" (YR)? So it's very much implicit in my suggestion that there may be a number of "formulas" involved in expressing SR by YR. Isn't this something new? In a practical example next, I'll like you to consider the level of a typical 15 year old. This may represent a lot of information, but you don't run into the problems of considering different 30 year olds who may have obtained significant university training that makes it so much more complex because then you probably have to include all the information in the universities to accommodate all the 30 year olds. Or you can be specific and choose to model a 30 year old math student. Maybe after some analysis we come to the result that SR stands in relation to YR as rhetic acts stand in relation to phatic acts. This may be significant.
Posted 07/06/09 - 01:21 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Links to begin with:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syntactic
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Generative_semantics
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Semantics
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...hine_learning%29
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/...epresentation%29
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computer-science/
Hah! Below is the exact same question of this thread! "Does syntax explain semantics?" How beautiful!
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/
Posted 07/07/09 - 01:01 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I want to look at approaches. I've been thinking of analogies of search engines. To make searches that way is the semantic input, syntactic approach on semantics.
The data sources are uploaded to the net. This information is tagged semantically by the uploaders by what they think are appropriate and relevant.
The search engine has a database with this tagged information. This makes the foundation for the syntactic query from the semantic input to the search engine.
Finally, the users of the search engine flash through content in their mind and make the semantic choice of words to put into the search engine for their search.
The chain is thus: semantics (word, symbol-input) <-> syntax (word, symbol-connectors) <-> semantics (source, word, symbol-tags). The syntactic-semantic machine (SySeM) has an in-built "science", rules world-view. It also has semantics as pre-programmed reactions for the future interaction of the program and its user. It's uploaded with content according to whatever it is supposed to represent. It also has this crucial syntax for making the best returns from its content as is its programmed analysis of what is asked.
Colour analysis program - implicit and possibly actual conversation:
User: I want to analyse my pictures and movies and see what colours the material contain.
Program: May I see what you got? Please, upload the material!
User: Here it is!
Program: The colours and corresponding wave-lengths (and ranges) of your material are the following. Thanks for using my services! Take care!
This is the syntactic processing for producing semantic content. Btw, here are colours: Wikipedia and Nasa.
To me, this doesn't seem so bad an interaction for a user of a program. Perhaps some of the future lies in "humanising" that interaction is some way. People may think that this is about a relationship between the user and the program. This is wrong. It really is a relationship between the user and the programmer. The Turing-test is also of that kind of relationship, namely between the user and the programmer. I find there may be issues in the domains of questions, categories, topics, basic assumptions and examples of what is asked. To this there's semantics. You know, you have the issue with the trees of information. The question is how to make these accessible with the semantics of interaction and the syntactic processing. Maybe, to be completely accurate about it, one should go with "semantic-syntactic-semantic machine, (SeSySeM)".
I think one can imagine psychological profiles of our "15 year old friend", our ancient Greek servant. Really, I think utility should be the guiding star for the SySeM.
The uploader: I hope someone gets to use this. I have no clue if anyone at all finds it and I have no clue at all, if anyone, who they may be.
The searchengine: I'm processing, but I have no clue what it is.
The searcher: I have this word, but I have not a clue what's coming up.
All parties faces the unknown and the fixed semantic content is continually in the making. If you make an extensive logic, extensive algorithms, formulas, and procedures, this may capture so many possibilites that it practically represents infinity, the queries may never exhaust the system. Given still, a continuous data feed, the process may never stop, it's infinite. The fact that the intelligent processes are unknown, the consequences may be greatly rewarding depending on the queries, system, and the data feed. The perfect memory of computing may serve the user of the SySeM well.
Posted 01/29/10 - 12:45 AM: forums.philosophyforums.com
Bottom line of this is:
To what extent is semantics expressible in syntactics?
To what extent is syntactics expressible in semantics?
I find this quite unexplored and hard, this SeSySeM (M for machine).
A Solution to the Problem of Evil - A Theodicy
Posted 07/02/09 - 01:45 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I've also written a solution to the Problem of Evil:
A Solution to the Problem of Evil - A Theodicy
God is creating the best possible world. In creating the best possible world, God chooses the best possible process, namely the evolution. In showing shortcomings, people may fail the belief of God and replace partially that belief with ideas that lack in quality and therefore adhere to the instance of nothing. The beliefs that lack in quality make people fail. A bad quality is a quality that lacks in greater quality. The bad quality is therefore marked with something that is missing, it is marked with a degree of nothing. Evil is therefore of instance of nothing. So there it is, the world of something and nothing. God is represented with full and all quality. Perfection in this is open to all but it is of course difficult. In making the small great God is going full circle hence God’s own nature and this constitutes the perfect drama of full quality. It doesn’t necessarily end there. It can continue into more circles of even new dramas of the full scale of smaller quality processes into greater quality processes and back again to the full quality of God. The conclusion of this is naturally that we are a part of a perfect drama between the gravities of nothing and all on the path back to God from where we originated.
One of the twists in it equates evil with that which reduces something in quality. Evil is a kind of gravitational force pulling ie. reducing objects to nothing. So and so. Maybe I should work on it a little more.
It has been commented by bert1 who thinks it's poorly written. I guess that's just lucky me.
BTW, Leibniz, I think, defines evil as that which prevents the greater good from happening. (Theodicy, Essays..., Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2001)
Posted 07/02/09 - 03:01 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I hold that full evil is nothing. Surely, a child being raped suffers evil to some degree. Consequently, I try to show that existence is only good given by God due to God's nature. I don't reject the idea that people suffer from time to time a degree of evil and I certainly don't mean to belittle them. As long as people stay in the belief of goodness, they are saved from the full evil. In my version, your soul is saved if you nurture it no matter what the dire situation. People who suffer a degree of evil are being reduced as people so I think it's important that people avoid evil and get out of evil situations with or without the use of force as in self-defence. Is it better?
Posted 07/03/09 - 03:25 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Thanks for this comment. It warms me! The impression I have of Plato is that he thinks of this realm of perfect forms. Aristotles thinks of nature as perfect in itself. I'm in between these two in that I believe that nature holds perfection and that there is this substance that is missing that represents the key to holding the answer of what God finally is and the completion of a perfect image of nature. At one point, I've been considering myself a follower of Plato, but now that I know his texts I know I'm certainly not. Still the same, unconsciously, some bits may have been flying around inside my head computed into this present image. I want to have it cleared right away that I don't believe in a God different from this universe or separate from it. To me, God is nature, reality, the whole of all, perhaps with the exemption of this nothing that is evil. My theory is quite young still and there's more work to be done on it. Have this in mind, I don't believe in some traditional God! The entity God may be some kind of dormant matter, something fantastic beyond our imagination. It may also go this way: I give you life and this life you're given is dealt with in your life as given by some parameters. Depending on your performance you are given pleasure or opportunities anew when you're life ceases. Do you mind asking specific questions? It seems to me that your post is your thinking and I'm uncertain of where you're going.
I disagree. One that has everything can do something or several some that encompass an image all. I have this on my website: "God plays with one's self. And playing with one's self is as perfect as God self." It is God that is playing with God's own nature and it has to be as perfect as God's self and nothing less.
The "best possible world" is actually a logical truth since God is incapable of creating something lesser than God's self. Besides, this has been written in March, 2008. You can find it on my website, t-lea.net/philosophical_notes.html.
I've set it that way because I don't want to allow an epistemology where people are necessarily correct everytime they consider something. If God represents all in nature, every bit of quark and so on, people must be conjuring ideas that are faulty in order to be mistaken about nature ie. God and these ideas obviously lack in quality. If there are no cases where the ideas may be mistaken, there is a linearity straight into God's being and course of nature may be lightning quick. I don't consider perfection and moral perfection apart from one another. If God is then perfect, I think it follows that every place God creates must be the best ie. perfect. You may read the whole post to have a better impression of what I'm trying to say. Edit: a clarifier. When I use the word "world" I mean the whole universe. This universe can be seen as a shred of God, God's creation. I consider God to be the universe and all other universes (gravitational systems) as well as being beyond them. This turn is necessary for having the infinity cycle. I don't know if people feel it's any good, but infinity will always play the trump card in my explanations. I can't think of a perfect God if I don't get infinity with it. Infinity now!
Posted 07/03/09 - 12:42 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
When it comes to perfection, there can be only one objective set of principles, qualities, whatever. I think it's impossible for God to hold subjective values. Generally, God's just spurting universes, quite unable to do anything else than what consists in perfection. God is necessarily a prisoner of perfection. Otherwise one faces a host of ontological problems, like having a Flying Spaghetti Monster around. Since there's no subjective values in God, there's only this one set of perfect principles that constitutes a "best possible world". There may be several worlds equally created to the same "best" standard.
Posted 07/03/09 - 02:07 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
This is incorrect. I hold that Evil is outside of God. It's a contradiction to what is. Full evil is nothing. God is all. Nothing and all don't go together! Can nothing be part of substance? No! Besides, as I've stated before, God is the explanation to pre-BigBang and key to infinity. As God is the explanation to these and other anomalies, God is certainly not superfluous to the explanation.
Posted 07/03/09 - 02:37 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Evil must in this sense necessarily be outside of God. It's the strange situation that origin of evil is as primordial as God. I'm a little uncertain about the status of evil, but there may be not other possibility than to put it this way. This may be something new to the philosophy of religion!
Posted 07/03/09 - 03:07 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
There may be forces playing on us from the outside, nothing. It may seem strange that nothing can hold "force", but I see no other solution. Maybe I can point to relativity, where substance is creating a pull in the fabric of space. Maybe there's some strange way that nothing can create this pull as well toward God-all. As is demonstrated, a vacuum tends to be filled quickly with something. What do you think? Edit: Just a comment to Aquinas 1. way. Why can't God create or recreate God. Instead of the unmoved mover that I find implausible, one may point to a God in eternal cycle with itself? In ancient times, I believe, there has been an irrational fear to infinity and therefore Aquinas may have been forced to postulate an unmoved mover in the causation chain. Alright, there may be an issue with actuality and potentiality here. Maybe it can twist into "God (actuality) to medium (potentiality) to God (actuality)" in eternal cycle. The actuality and potentiality may not affect the nature of God on the other hand.
Posted 07/03/09 - 05:31 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I think I'm on the right track. The vacuum analogy may be just it. Physics is also not entirely firm on the issue of how matter distribute relative to the vacuum in space, isn't this correct? I believe there's also speculation what the outside of universe effects on the universe itself. There's obviously difficulties with God in relation to evil in the traditional sense and to this, my new approach may be just what is needed. As a result, I'll eat the strange from the outside nothing effects for now. Vacuum it is!
Posted 07/05/09 - 03:07 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
"The problem of evil" is only considered in the case of a "God". I read you, but your post doesn't add to the thread. That you throw "the problem of evil" out the window suggests that you don't believe in a God either, simply. Enjoy your journey with Nietzsche!
Posted 07/05/09 - 03:47 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
This is about Religion. It's thereby undeclared whether the statements reflect Reality or Fiction in the strictly objective sense.
The Encumbrance Theory of Intelligence (ETI) - Philosophy of Psychology?
Posted 07/23/09 - 10:13 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I'm not against operationalism of intelligence expressed as I.Q. I think it can be very useful and I also like the fact that the systems are continually reviewed and improved.
This theory assumes that the mind continuously considers objects of interest, both necessary and optional. When one puts the mind to something this process runs until the mind deems it finished, temporarily or finally.
The ETI is the notion that people who are caught in struggles in life scores lower on I.Q.-tests than their non-trifled counterparts. The premise is that those who are caught in difficult struggles have to devote resources of their consciousness to the problem so when these are tested, their mind is simultaneously considering other issues as well on some level. In a sense they are not truly free, enjoying freedom.
Unencumbered people are free to be as aggressive on intellectual challenges as much as their hearts can pump blood through the brain. They have no serious worries occupying their minds.
Besides, in this, I assume that people are made up of "souls" and are initially equally perfect. It's the environment that hooks up their processes of consc. to the level of their current picture of intelligence, say I.Q. That is, reality is detriment to the ideal, "soul" condition. Obviously, I don't argue from the premise of souls which I find rather distasteful at the present moment. Nurture can do a lot to people, I find. I say this so that you may get a clue from where I'm coming from. In a sense, people are perfect as reactions from the factors of life. Edit: "That is, reality is detriment to the ideal, "soul" condition." Don't get me wrong! It's apparent that you build your intelligence through the course of life and that death, of what we know for sure, extinguishes both life and intelligence.
Alright! This is the start. There will be more.
I look forward to your opinions! Feel free to throw in what you think is appropriate! There is a book on the other side of "The Bell Curve" that I'm looking for, but it's not "The Bell Curve Discussion". Any suggestions?
Posted 07/24/09 - 04:17 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I agree that my theory doesn't account for physical (genetic) defects or brain diseases. It's the case that I don't intend to make it that way. I can however interpret you to mean also the physical structure that is supposed to make the impression of qualia or whatever and in this respect also, my theory is flat. I hold that if the brain is relatively healthy, my theory says something despite relatively small differences. Two people who score 170 in IQ are analogous to two people who bench 150 kg. I see no important differences between those two sets. I agree that intelligence is a complex issue (therefore operationalism), but I also have the impression that smart people in science are quite open to talk about intelligence and what makes them good. Access to data is plentiful in other words.
A Possible Explanation of Identity - Is this any good to the problems of Identity?
Posted 07/22/09 - 10:50 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I think the following represents a succinct explanation to Identity.
An Answer to Identity
The origin that is the basis of your parents including genetics, the persistence of the processes in the consciousness, and the history of this consciousness are that which makes up the identity of a person. Alzheimer's disease may question a number of issues. What do you think about split personality? What is the identity of a person that suffers from Alzheimer's disease? The things that have been mediated over and should be mediated over.
What do you say?
Posted 07/24/09 - 02:06 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
1.) First of all, I don't think my writing suggests that surrogate children, children abandoned in infancy and raised in another culture or children who never know their parents or their culture lack anything in their identity, formally. There may be psychological issues here, but now I'm concerned with the metaphysics. The reason I name it "basis" is because I imply a kind of qualia or soul argument. It's not necessary to throw this in, but I like it that way so that I'm not missing anything. I suggest that most is cared for through the proper vehicles, sperm and egg. There may be advantages to the child having "true" biological relationships, but it's more psychology than metaphysics.
2.) I use consciousness in the wide sense. You can say soul just as well, but I really hate to use the word "soul" at this point. The consciousness I'm referring to here is the (strictly and "scientific") individual. If there is such a thing as a communal mind, I think this must be God and nothing else. Persistence is used here as the word "continuity" and this should suffice. In the case of damages or illnesses, I hold that the expression of the consciousness through the brain is, of course, limited, but when the body dies there may be a possible rebound into a fine soul again with the restored identity. I think that souls are always perfect, but there may be some issues to work out still. The consciousness that dreams of being a butterfly will still have the history of a human (think of this in the "soul" sense) and as such is no more than mere imagination or sleep.
3.) I have intended my writings in this thread to reflect a strictly metaphysical issue. There may be something that can be carried over into Philosophy of Math, for example, but they are separate issues from exactly this.
You make a very nice comment here. However, I'm so irritated with the deficiencies of the Standard Model in physics that I stick to the substance dualism, interactionism for now.
Cheers!
An Attack on Indexicality
Note: The writing has been placed on its own webpage to preserve its original form while being reshaped to the form of a more readable and better "academic" form that conforms (in the end) with the Chicago Style that many academic papers are written in. I also hope that this writing in the end also goes for being a classic academic paper itself.
Link: An Attack on Indexicality, by the webpage: AAoIndexicality.html
An Argument in Favour of Abortion
Posted: Fri May 29, 2009 5:15 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
Is it not better to let a fetus die that has virtually no consciousness than to let a human go to hell in full consciousness? I give a clear affirmation to this question.
What do you think? I know it sounds a little utilitarian, but I'm in favour of abortion.
Posted: Fri May 29, 2009 11:24 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
I don't think abortion is appealing either, but in certain situations it's better to have the abortion than to put the future human in an unbearable situation later. Maybe there's a likelihood of making better people when they are truly wanted.
I have used "go to hell" as a picture of a future, very bad situation. It's certainly not meant to evoke religious prejudices. Do you think sperm and an egg makes a human being right after conception? Just curious!
Posted: Fri Jun 25, 2010 11:03 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Some information on abortion and fetus awareness.
By The Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynaecologists (RCOG)
Fetal Awareness - Review of Research and Recommendations for Practice
From this link:
http://www.rcog.org.uk/fetal-awareness-review-research-and-recommendations-practice
Fetal Awareness
* The fetus cannot feel pain before 24 weeks because the connections in the fetal brain are not fully formed
* Evidence examined by the Working Party showed that the fetus, while in the chemical environment of the womb, is in a state of induced sleep and is unconscious
* The Working Party concluded that because the 24 week-old fetus has no awareness nor can it feel pain, the use of analgesia is of no benefit
* More research is needed into the short and long-term effects of the use of fetal analgesia post-24 weeks.
The full report: http://www.rcog.org.uk/files/rcog-corp/RCOGFetalAwarenessWPR0610.pdf
Article, this particular webpage, is published: 25/06/2010 (summary and more).
Demarcation Against Religion - Is It In Vain?
Posted 06/19/09 - 10:59 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
What I want to make a conjecture of, I believe, will have an easier solution than Hilberts 8. problem.
The conjecture!
It seems to me that to make the conjecture that science will be able to describe every problem of religious kind including the question of the existence of God or such, eclipse every religious claim and therefore I make the conjecture hereby that the demarcation-against-religion-work in Philosophy of Science is futile and in vain because in reality, I suspect, every question answered by religion will be solved by science absolving every neeed of demarcation against religion. Though I find the strange, perhaps paradoxical situation that demarcation against metaphysics still stands. Of course, when I write this I make a number of assumptions in both religious issues as well as scientific ones.
I'll refine this so I'm getting back at it. I just want to post it now.
So... What do you think? Am I crazy?
Posted 06/20/09 - 03:56 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
If one gets access to infinity by future-science, it should also become clear what the fundamental reason for our presence is. Thereby, the question why we exist, is relieved and no longer is needed to be asked. Likewise, if we get to decide by future-science what consciousness stems from and how life comes into being, religion is so utterly reduced to insignificance that there is no need for it. All the fundamental questions will have been answered by future-science.
So therefore, the conclusion has to be that the question of demarcation against religion may only be a question of what one ascribes to the capacity of future-science. As one can assert this belief, even only hypothetically, it shows that the demarcation issue against religion is indeed impossible. There you have it! There is no wonder why it has been so bloody hard to make the demarcation against religion.
Posted 06/21/09 - 06:45 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Basically, I find two areas that science borders to, metaphysics and religion. Traditionally, it has been a problem to make a sound demarcation against religion, that is, it has been impossible to separate science from religion. Some people may see science as just another form of religion of which I disagree strongly. I must say the issue isn't "simply a matter of noting", it's quite hard work. In the making of the demarcation against everything that isn't science, I think it has been implied that one can get to scientific solutions faster if the non-science has been cut out of the picture.
Edit: When those two areas mix with science we get pseudo-science, just so you know I haven't left it out of the picture. People may protest to this by claiming that some metaphysics necessarily is part of science. This is correct, I think, but I don't want to get into the demarcation against metaphysics. I do, however, have strong opinions on this as well.
I'm making the conjecture that science in the future will answer the core claims of religions and thereby reducing them to metaphysical assumptions more or less meaningful.
I find that religions are made up of a core of claims, not fully, but most importantly. These are usually the answers to existence, consciousness, and infinity. In the past, I have been thinking that religions make equal claims in that they basically answer the same issues, but in a different way. Lately, though, I have come to believe that if I make the conjecture that science in the future will answer the core questions, religions will fall away and be redefined as "religions" that make a bunch of metaphysical claims. I think it also includes that science in the future will present an uniform belief system to all people living at that point in time. This may present a significant change, I suppose.
Posted 07/26/09 - 11:37 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I realise I'm addicted to the meaning of religion, but I also find that I can mostly drop religion if the "core claims" of it are answered. Now, it's just not likely that I'm alive if that happens, but at that point, I can imagine people beginning to worship comics and imaginary beings. Religion, now, isn't meaningless, I think.
Marilyn McCord Adams on Evil - Pessimism Or Optimism, Believer Or Not
Posted 07/23/09 - 01:52 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Hello. I've been listening to Marilyn McCord Adams and Nigel Warburton on Philosophy Bites, http://www.nigelwarburton.typepad.com/philosophy_bites/, Marilyn McCord Adams on Evil.
Her argument has an outlook on the Problem of Evil that turns the Problem of Evil on its head. It says something like the following. Horrendous evil may only effectively be met with a belief in God. In the regard of evil, she especially focuses on changes in the mind from the consequences of evil. You may better get the app. 15 min. of philosophy from the link that is given because I'm not sure if this is sufficient for her view presented therein.
I'll try to present a rather quick reply that contests the necessity of a belief in God. Really, I'm a deist as I've noted elsewhere. The issue is that I'm against a forced feeding of God down people's throats on the premise that otherwise you'll be condemned. So, I hold there are good outlooks for both believers and non-believers alike in the face of dire, evil situations. Factual issues from psychology may play in here and perhaps strengthen one or the other argument. Pessimistic people may in every way, whether believers or not, commit serious mistakes on their mindset in respect of death. On the other hand, pessimism should be dissolved at the moment near death or in death. Self-hatred, I think, is likely to send you to the dark orbits and condemn yourself due to yourself. In short, we deal with optimistic people in every situation. As Marilyn McCord Adams has made the case for the believers, I'll make the case for the fine moment for non-believers.
There is nothing in nature that determines the grim fate for people simply because of a lack of faith in God. I think it can very much be equally rational to hold atheistic, agnostic views in relation to the issue of God in being in a horrendous, evil situation. Let's suppose there are mechanisms in nature that makes your consciousness experience orgasm from the relief of pain, all pain. Let's further suppose that this orgasmic moment puts a verdict on the history of your consciousness, short or long. You may see your life flash through your consciousness in this moment of orgasm. I think there's a possibility to believe that this very moment makes the view of that history not so bad after all. This moment may turn the consciousness around and make that safe, "eternal" sleep comfortably so. Let's call this moment optimistic. I hypothesise that there may exist a good reason to believe in a catch-all function, mechanism, law of nature that works as that good pillow one is probably longing for. I find this equally credible as the idea of God. I mean, the two may very well coincide. Perhaps, this hypothetical trait of nature plays back on itself so that life in itself is more positive than we may expect. Death may be a pleasurable experience in every respect if one gets close enough in on it. This may be counterintuitive to common beliefs, but I assert it nonetheless. I don't think there are any necessary connections that have been found, proving decisive for either argument, Marilyn McCord Adams' or my own. At this point, either argument may have equal standing. I may say "God is good" or "nature is kind" confidently.
I appreciate feedback on this. I find this particular podcast interesting at least. What do you think?
Stay positive! Cheers!
Objectivity of the Senses - Building A Better Metaphysics
Posted 08/28/09 - 08:33 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I would like to see the efforts in metaphysics being cumulative rather than having every argument starting from scratch. One of the presumptions to this, perhaps alongside the metaphysics computer-database, is being in the right mind. So to start, making assumptions on colours, one needs to be correct on the colour and its corresponding wavelength. I don't buy it if you mix the colours or are otherwise incorrect about perceptions where we have sound confirmations and consensus. Purple is purple, blue is blue, and black is black. The same way, I sense, there may be possibilities in qualifying cognitions as well and this is the very thing.
The skeptic is happy to assert that the reality is illusion and so, but if that is the case what is reality supposed to name? What is an illusion if there is no reality?
This thread is all about making visible a foundation for the Babel's tower in metaphysics and at the same putting the skeptics soundly into the corner. You can, I guess, rightfully question all the metaphysical issues, but there is a difference in questioning and refuting.
I usually pay great respect to the way language has evolved. I hold that most words reflect real concerns when they have arisen. I don't mean to make this metaphysics a matter of a phil. of language argument, but I rather like to point to the underlying basis for making the words happen.
If we consider Berkeley's ideas versus Leibniz' monads, I certainly find that Leibniz is making a better point than Berkeley in that ideas are held in people's minds making the argmuent counterintuitive while monads, you know, have this unknown quality to it that make the basic building bricks in nature just as strings in string theory.
Posted 08/28/09 - 11:22 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Take for instance the assumptions that you put down in the metaphysical argument of reality. Perhaps one can begin the investigation of reality just there and see what one should qualify for getting into the nest level of just that investigation of reality.
I find it funny that you call it illusion that which is in just your eyes, head, and opinion. Sure, you can approach the expressions of your consciousness, examine them more closely, contemplate them more thoroughly.
Posted 08/28/09 - 11:29 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Isn't there something called "neutral" lighting?
Surely, black cats exist! What is it you want to make a point of? I bet you have experienced your life-world tangling with other people's life-world and that between you that you share. Isn't this "a poly-istic functional foundation to actually observe reality"? I don't know exactly what you mean by that, btw. Also, I rather say "confirmation".
Posted 08/29/09 - 01:05 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I'll point to the object of a cup and I say this is a cup, Plato's cup if there are circumstances that call for the fact that it's Plato's cup.
With the case of colour: We both identify correctly the colour in issue and we can use a method that confirms this. Our language has this word and our reality contains this method. Effectively we both use the word for this colour in each others' life-worlds and still you refuse to call it "reality"? If so, can I call you a skeptic? Are you arguing for the position of a skeptic?
Posted 08/29/09 - 01:40 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Usually documents allow for drawings and pictures and I think therefore that it might not be necessary for "rigid terminology to define reality". The documentation should however spark an idea and interest.
I find the fact that we learn from one another and rather obviously cross pathways are strong suggestions that we live in common reality. This is not exhaustive as argument, but it will suffice for now.
Friend and foe philosophers
Posted 09/18/09 - 01:24 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
Friends:
Immanuel Kant - Service: Craftsmanship, deep thoughts, system, explication
Rudolf Carnap - Service: System and program in Philosophy of Science
Carl Hempel - Service: Sound descriptions in Philosophy of Science
Karl Popper - Service: Falsification, sound work
Maurice Merleau-Ponty - Service: Strengthening of Phenomenology
Rene Descartes - Service: The showcase of meditation
Thomas Aquinas - Service: Fine work in the attempt to prove God's existence
Søren Kierkegaard - Service: Emphasis on ethics, morals, and life's important questions
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz - Service: Explication of the Monads theory, display of good work in matters of good and evil
Gottlob Frege - Service: Great work in semantics, logic, and mathematics (much largely beyond my understanding at this point)
Democritus - Service: Making such work that it's still good 2400 years later
Euclid - Service: Classic work in geometry (should he be here?)
Edmund Husserl - Service: Initiation of phenomenology, sound work (I need to know more about this guy, but he has the benefit of doubt)
Jürgen Habermas - Service: Positive work, sound ethics
Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein - Service: Important part of the Vienna Circle, some really good points
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel - Service: System, dialectic (I dont' know him well, but include him)
Imre Lakatos - Service: Research Programmes in Philosophy of Science (damn, how could I keep forgetting him?)
Michael Polanyi - Service: Added elaboration to Philosophy of Science by Personal Knowledge and the importance of the knowledge that lies in the personal approach. The virtue of being passionate?
Bertrand Russell - Service: Principia Mathematica and the attempt to unite Logics and Mathematics
Alfred North Whitehead - Service: Principia Mathematica and the attempt to unite Logics and Mathematics and Process Philosophy, possibly
Possibly friends also:
Paul Ricoeur - Service: Fine work in Philosophy of language
Jacques Derrida - Service: Fine work in Philosophy of language
Ferdinand de Saussure - Service: Fine work in Philosophy of language
Foes:
Willard Van Ormen Quine - Crime: Relative naturalism
David Hume - Crime: Skepticism in Philosophy of Science
Thomas Kuhn - Crime: Structured relativism in Philosophy of Science
Friedrich Nietzsche - Crime: Power-fixation, myopic thinking, ie. rejection of logic
Paul Karl Feyerabend - Crime: The anarcho-syndicate in Philosophy of Science (yes, you belong here!)
Pierre Maurice Marie Duhem - Crime: Spreading doubts in Philosophy of Science (one that the Inquisition finds Heretic)
Nelson Goodman - Crime: Fumbling with time-manipulation, relativist?
George Berkeley - Crime: God's world-guarantee, futility, inexplicability, inefficiency
Georges Canguilhem - Crime: Skepticism/Relativism in Philosophy of Science
Michel Foucault - Crime: Skepticism/Relativism in Philosophy of Science
Socrates - Crime: Ignorance and "I know nothing!"
I'll add more, definitely! This list is subject to revision. I still feel like a novice in philosophy even though I've been interested since 1998 (or a little earlier). There's so much smart thoughts to read!
Posted: Fri Jun 25, 2010 8:58 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I can add 3 more people "of interest" who are possibly on the Friend part of the list. These are:
Paul Ricoeur
Jacques Derrida
Ferdinand de Saussure
They're all language philosophers and at the present I don't have the knowledge to pass a good judgment on their efforts other than being fascinated by their work to the extent they are possibly on the Friend list.
Posted: Fri Aug 20, 2010 5:58 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I'll add Bertrand Russell and Alfred Norman Whitehead for their Principia Mathematica and for trying to unite Logics and Mathematics as friends! Whitehead also, possibly, for Process Philosophy, although it is by and large unknown to me presently!
Also another foe: Socrates - Crime: Ignorance and "I know nothing!"
Standards of Business Practice - Facilitation of Corruption Charges to Prevent Greed on Wall Street and Elsewhere
Posted: Sat Sep 19, 2009 10:42 am; forum.philosophynow.org
Should one erect a supervision entity that can punish greed by pointing at taking unreasonable risk? Paul Krugman lashes out at the academic economists because they are no good according to his claims.
It is my opinion that people are reasonable rational in the market, but there may exist business cultures that drive the economists crazy and make them go into greed mode. The economists then begin to seek insane short-term profits. Therefore, while one can assume good market mechanisms most of the time, one should perhaps make room for the abnormal bounds in the market assumptions. Should we cool down this possibility, mode of greed by threatening with strict prison sentences and harsh economic fines, both corporate and personal?
From what I read of the financial crisis, the institutions of surveillance have been way passive and lenient. My suggestion of both correction of the theoretical foundation and institutional changes here may initiate better times lasting longer and preventing insane ups and downs. I'm just thinking loudly here.
This note is made as a reaction to the article, "How Did Economists Get It So Wrong?" by Paul Krugman in New York Times.
Posted: Sat Sep 19, 2009 8:52 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
When I point to risk I'm thinking of the failure by banks to charge extra money for their increased risk-taking in the sub-prime market. If one could have people looking at risk-factors solely, the supervision-entity, it may be able to prevent that kind of craving that we have seen leading up to the financial crisis.
There's another factor too. The banks and The Federal Reserve have been showing extremely little cooperated play in playing the sub-prime. If one can hypothesise that the interest rate from the Fed. would have remained low longer while giving signals to the bank industry that they would expect gradual increases in some time, I guess it may have been a whole different story. I think the shift from Greenspan to the moron Bernanke, who have been setting in too harsh measures to protect the currency, the dollar, has proven disastrous. I, at that time, would have liked to see a drop (inflation) in the value of the dollar. This could regulate, at the time, U.S. industry to export more and making US citizens more careful with the money.
It's all over now and I feel the world has been paying for U.S. greed and failure! USA and I are still friends, but I like to never see it, the recession, again!
Posted: Sun Sep 20, 2009 12:18 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
I'm in the belief that there's been failures in the "sub-prime market". Isn't it really a fact that people who have been wanting a house, a place to live, have not had the economic ability to carry the economic burden for very long. The "sub-prime market" has proved riskier than the greed has been able to see.
When you invest in, let's say, Microsoft, isn't there actually a "roof" that is a function of the "yield"? I believe that there's a limit to speculation if the object of investment has a limited profitability, ie. every object of investment. If there's a low "yield" to the stockholders, the potential of the stock price is also limited. Am I terribly wrong?
Posted: Sun Sep 20, 2009 3:38 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
I think you're wrong in much of what you write. You come across as some kind of communist, anti-economics. First, the instrument of economy is to value objects, concrete or abstract. If the instrument of economy is very precise then one can put trust in its output. This is always done in the basic cases. I agree that society is building value. It's the activity of people that produces objects of value whether this is the pumping of oil, surveillance of production processes, driving the bus, trading stocks, making watches, performing, making art, educating, researching, inventing, and the lot. Creating value is not exploiting, no, it's doing work, using one's talents (perhaps less visible in the case of the cleaner, but no less, ie. being a nice person etc.) Let me present two cases, Microsoft and Google. Do you say they're not serving the market? Are they disrespectful? Do you feel exploited by them? Let me remind you of comfortable, easy computing for all sorts of issues and the precise searches on the internet also putting marketing at your fingertips and a whole lot more, all in favour of these two. I say virtues of their work make their (financial) success.
"The raison d’être of markets" is value, valuable objects. The market ensures access for and to these valuable objects, in both the sense of buying and selling. The financial system is supposed to contribute fluidity of economy in the service of value, valuable objects and accountability, responsibility. The notion of "fine-tuning" is about making the system useful and non-disastrous, non-exploitable, ie. Madoff, credit default-swaps.
"The idea of the economy is to make money." Thanks! The value of money is guaranteed by the state by the security of all products and services combined. Money can be made in the sense that the state chooses to "expand" the economy by making a too big state-budget, ie. state spending, and/or through excessive lending to banks, ie. making money too accessible and cheap. The "expansion" of economy usually leads to inflation, ie. money becomes less worthy, this in turn leads to less imports from other currency systems. Money represents an obligation on the state.
The loan from the bank to this person enables this person to make an investment in a house. Instead of wasting money renting, this person places a regular amount of money in this person's investment. Usually, this person is far better off in twenty-five years because in the meanwhile inflation, increase in this person's wages has made it cheaper to pay this loan. I see that the inflation also reduces the value of the house, but at this point, this person now has wealth, assets, while in the past this person has had nothing!
Comment on Companions in Guilt - Arguments for Ethical Objectivity - By Hallvard Lillehammer
Posted 11/09/09 - 01:56 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
To begin with, I believe in ethical, moral objectivity. I believe there's no particular problem in proving this.
1. That the ethical system is flawless in the sense that there is no obvious allowance of moral wrongdoing in it.
2. "...ethical claims are objective if it is possible for agents who make them to do so correctly or incorrectly. Objectivity in this sense implies the possibility of moral error.(3)" That is to say that moral mistakes exist, not that moral errors are committed ethically.
3. "...ethical claims are objective if they are 'answerable to substantial [ethical] facts and properties in the world that exist independently of the contingent practice of making those claims and the relevant attitudes of those who make them' (p. 6)(1).(4)"
4. "...ethical claims are objective if reasonable agents competent with the concepts that constitute them would converge in 'favorable circumstances of rational inquiry' (p. 7)(2).(5)" That is to say, in my opinion, that there are objective moral duties in relation to the object in question.
From the book review of (1)(2)Hallvard Lillehammer's Companions in Guilt: Arguments for Ethical Objectivity written by (3)(4)(5)Terence Cuneo in the journal Mind Volume 118, Number 470, April 2009, ISSN 0026-4423.
It's also worth mentioning the book of Paul Bloomfield's Moral Reality, OUP, 2004 that the review mentions.
One more thing: I think it should be noted that "reasonable agents" mean people who are able to separate right from wrong and are basically in agreement with the actual system of ethics in question. If the case is otherwise, they fall into a different group and are not relevant to the system that is being discussed. This may limit the number of people who can adhere to that system quite severely, but that is the nature of the current diversity of humanity.
I've made some additions to the book review and as such the whole is more a new argument than a factual instance that I like to address. [The Comment(s) have been transferred to Phil. Notes for more serious discussion and for being a long-term project]
Objection to Berkeley's Idealism
Posted 11/09/09 - 10:56 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
A small comment on Berkeley: If it's so that ideas make up reality then ideas must be substance, but this should be wrong because the brain stops growing by the age of about 18 so that when you're 50 and thriving in philosophy your head should explode by all the substance-ideas it has gathered. Obviously, there should be separation between reality-ideas and ideas-ideas in the system of Berkeley, but there's not! He should therefore be wrong, right?
The Democratic View of the Miracles of Angels
Posted 01/04/10 - 08:48 AM: forums.philosophyforums.com
While the Catholic Church is seeing itself as exercising the miracle of (the) Angels, I think it's about appreciating the whole life as the miracle of divine matters in that you nurture your own personal (potential) Angel-nature and by doing this correctly you also side with and work with exactly those angels of the Catholic Church without being a Catholic. As such, one is enjoying Angels' work and miracle in one's own life by one's good integrity and moral and this makes a beautiful foundation for appreciation. Life is a miracle! Cheers!
Are emotions rational?
Posted 01/10/10 - 11:20 AM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I hold these views:
I believe that if emotions are perceived correctly, they can indeed represent the subsumed rationality.
Shedding tears in respect or in facing greater responsibiliy and challenges due to the loss of this loved one. If you had no favourable propositions in your head of this person, there would be no loss. How this "porting" of the consciousness to emotions and back go, I can't say, but I don't deny the possibility that there's perfection behind it. So, I'm with Yahadreas and possibly beyond.
Posted 01/10/10 - 02:15 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
As such, feelings/emotions are a part of the sense apparatus, not only this, but also from the brain, reflects the persistent strains of that consciousness, I think. Perhaps it's worthwhile in this thread to separate emotion, sentiment and feeling. Feeling being the pure electrical signal in the nerves, sentiment being a psychological inclination of having a positive or negative attitude to something, emotion can be the mix of these two.
At one time, I've been drooling over: Philosophy of Emotion from Oxford Univ. Press that should probably give everyone a fine start on the subject!
Posted: Mon Jan 11, 2010 9:50 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
My respects for this thread go to Holdyourcolor of PF, http://forums.philosophyforums.com/threads/are-emotions-irrational-38870.html.
So, are emotions rational?
I hold these views:
I believe that if emotions are perceived correctly, they can indeed represent the subsumed rationality.
Shedding tears in respect or in facing greater responsibiliy and challenges due to the loss of this loved one. If you had no favourable propositions in your head of this person, there would be no loss. How this "porting" of the consciousness to emotions and back go, I can't say, but I don't deny the possibility that there's perfection behind it. So, I'm with Yahadreas [a writer on this forum, Philosophyforums] and possibly beyond.
Posted: Fri Oct 01, 2010 8:49 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I think you do indeed have the choice to "listen" to your feelings or ignore them! In this way, feelings may be a source for data and thus rational, but not necessarily as many people ignore them.
Posted: Fri Oct 01, 2010 9:38 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Can you, by 100% certainty, say that feelings (in the body) are not a reflection of the state of affairs in the brain? Similarly, can you, by 100% certainty, say that feelings (in the body) are not a reflection of the state of affairs in the brain by volition, just like every other thought? No, I think you can't!!
chaz wyman writes:
"This is a bit like asking is chalk cheese, or how chalky is cheese; how cheesey is chalk.
As a given emotion is never the necessary consequence of any particular state of affairs is is then not a rational action.
I suggest that any emotional state could be examined in this way, and a more rational course of action chosen, than a unbidden emotional state."
NO!!!
And as usual, I dispute that feelings are non-rational, non-cognitive or whatever else, very much in line with my view that feelings can be rational to a great extent (beyond being pure maintenance of the body). Thank you.
Posted: Fri Feb 18, 2011 3:00 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
i blame blame writes:
"Is pain rational?
Is the sensation of relative temperature rational?
Is smell rational?"
Where does that limit go? If you have no data to enter your biological system, how are you supposed to live? How can you be alive without it? Therefore, as conditions are premises (in a logical argument, syllogism), they have consequences on exactly this biological system of yours and this biological feedback of the environment makes you able to sustain yourself. It's therefore highly rational to have these feelings because they make you able to build this rationality further, either in yourself or through humanity as such!
Non-Dogmatic Intelligent Design - The Minimum Requirements to Constitute "Godliness"
Posted 01/27/10 - 08:21 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
This being has to be the creator of this and all other universes if they exist. It needs to be perfect in nature and represent this perfection (because of the problem of evil). It needs to infinite (because of the causality against it). It needs to represent infinity also to intelligent beings if not to all matter and energy and "souls" in the universes. What more? Let me think.
It also needs to be coherent with all of science that proves true or is accepted as true today. So this being needs to fulfill criteria of truth to the full extent (not being a "psychological" entity).
Due Process, Technology, and the Future
Posted 01/27/10 - 08:36 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
Yes, I put my vote in for the possibility of removing the least of doubt by technology.
Actually, I hope it happens, not for a police-state to emerge, but for making the democracy achieve its height of full worth! Besides, you paranoia people, the very democracy needs to be dismantled and thoroughly removed and I can't see how that's supposed to happen. As democracies have been introduced in the western world, they've stayed democracies up until today and I think they represent infinity principles of just, human rule!
Posted 01/29/10 - 02:20 AM: forums.philosophyforums.com
I wonder what you guys think of the Data Storage Directive of EU in this regard? Have you heard about it? What I'm getting, is that all "connections" from internet- and tele-traffic is to be stored for 6 months and be available to the police in order to effectively combat serious crime. Any good?
I can add, I'm all for it! Look to my other post in this thread for its reason. You should also remember that "best, possible goodness" has never been tried out in a society before! I really think we should go for it.
Logic of Ethics
Posted 01/27/10 - 09:50 PM; forums.philosophyforums.com
I'm thinking there might be a logic of ethics: instead of true and false, there's right and wrong.
It goes: it is wrong to commit (blind) violence, therefore one does not commit (blind) violence.
This can go on endlessly for every rule (they have to be rules in this) and such that the logic of ethics should be clear and the "ought" is more a convention of saying something.
Rephrasing Ought in a Sentence - Ought-less Language
Posted 01/27/10 - 11:06 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
Rewriting of ought: An action is defined by a rule. This rule is in relation to a certain condition. This rule is followed so and so. This rule isn't necessarily fulfilled by the agent who is following this rule.
But seriously, has it been the case that ought has been irreducible in the past?
Posted 01/27/10 - 11:06 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
I think "ought" says this: you have a duty to do, but you can refuse to carry it through. "Ought" doesn't imply necessity and it does include human weakness implicitly. That is, you are likely to do it (as you should), but at times we all break our rules. No?
Dictionary.com:
1. (used to express duty or moral obligation): Every citizen ought to help.
2. (used to express justice, moral rightness, or the like): He ought to be punished. You ought to be ashamed.
3. (used to express propriety, appropriateness, etc.): You ought to be home early. We ought to bring her some flowers.
4. (used to express probability or natural consequence): That ought to be our train now.
Posted 01/28/10 - 05:32 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
The intention is to simply making the reduction of the convention (possibly) of "ought" by "is" statements, is what I want with this.
Posted 01/28/10 - 05:41 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
"Rewriting of ought: An action is defined by a rule. This rule is in relation to a certain condition. This rule is followed so and so. This rule isn't necessarily fulfilled by the agent who is following this rule."
Yahadreas' example: "You ought to brush your teeth"
becomes...
There is a rule that says brush your teeth. This rule is the condition of brushing one's teeth. I follow this rule by brushing my teeth. However, I don't always brush my teeth.
Posted 01/28/10 - 11:07 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
jsidelko's example: "If you have a temperature tomorrow, you ought to visit the doctor."
Posted 01/28/10 - 11:52 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
There is a rule that says that if you have a temperature tomorrow, you visit the doctor. This rule is the condition of having a temperature. I follow this rule by visiting the doctor. However, I don't always visit my doctor when I have a temperature.
Posted: Fri Jul 09, 2010 1:28 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Metadigital writes: "There ought to be less oughts in the world, ought there?"
Reiteration: An action is defined by a rule. This rule is in relation to a certain condition. This rule is followed so and so. This rule isn't necessarily fulfilled by the agent who is following this rule.
And so: (1)"An action is defined by a rule. This rule is in relation to a certain condition. This rule is followed so and so. This rule isn't necessarily fulfilled by the agent who is following this rule." and (2)such that there are less "actions that are defined by a rule. This rule is in relation to a certain condition. This rule is followed so and so. This rule isn't necessarily fulfilled by the agent who is following this rule." and (3)is this "an action is defined by a rule. This rule is in relation to a certain condition. This rule is followed so and so. This rule isn't necessarily fulfilled by the agent who is following this rule."?
So this is even more ought-less now, I guess!
Objection to Any Ambiguity of Moral Language
Posted 01/27/10 - 11:33 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
Why is there a problem with making an acknowledgement that a totally ethical/moral society is the most effective society in every respect? Should this impose problems? Why can't any religious "fantasies" (of Heaven) or atheistic "dreams" (of interplanetary conquers) be just some side-effects? I'm wondering.
Posted 01/28/10 - 05:53 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
At least, Comment on Companions in Guilt - Arguments for Ethical Objectivity - By Hallvard Lillehammer tries to find a (possible) cognitive common foundation of ethics and without any [by Yahadreas] 'non-natural property of goodness'. You may be out of line here. Even Bloomfield, that you'll find in the thread, speaks of moral realism as (physical) health. I understand you very well if you absolutely have to include 'non-natural property of goodness', but I really think of it more as religious/agnostic than being a goal for ethics itself.
Posted 01/28/10 - 05:59 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
At least, "morality" to effectuate "physical health", perhaps pointing to a basic property in nature in living things. Where it leads to is the cusp of that specie's world.
Posted 01/28/10 - 06:12 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
Possibly, in Bloomfield's sense, a group of animals or humans has greater chances of making the future generations of itself by "morality" insofar it effectuates "physical health" in that group.
The Logic of Free Will
Posted 01/28/10 - 04:20 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
[By Yahadreas, quote:
P1: Either an event is caused or it is not caused. If an event is caused then it is a change in state (in principle) explained by some other state. For example, I hit the ball with my cue; the ball travels forward. The ball travelling forward was caused. If an event is not caused then it is a change in state (in principle) not explained by some other state (in other words, is (strictly) spontaneous). For example, the ball travels forward (without being hit by my cue (or another entity (or subject to a new gravitational force))).
P2: One is one's (cognitive and sensory) awareness. If one has a qualitative experience (sensory awareness) of happiness then one is happy. If one has a thought (cognitive awareness) of wanting to be happy then one wants to be happy.
P3: One's will is one's intent (conscious decision) (to act). If I intend (consciously decide) to strike with my cue then it is my will to strike with my cue.
P4: Free will is (1) one's will being the cause of (or necessarily correlative with) the (subsequent) willed act or (2) one's will being (caused by) one's self.
P5: Events cannot cause prior events.
C1 (from P2, P3, and P4): One has free will2.
C2 (from P1and P5): Either one's self emerged spontaneously or one's self emerged as an effect of some other (non-self) state; it did not (could not) (initially) cause itself.
C3 (from P4 (and P1)): Determinism is necessary for free will1 (at least with respect to the relationship between the will and the willed act).
C4 (from C1 and P4): C2 is irrelevant to free will.
Nicely done and set up, Yahadreas!
Perhaps it can be possible to write it like this:
P5: Physical events cannot cause prior physical events. I'm not certain how self/consciousness works in this picture.
C3 (from P4 (and P1)): Causality is necessary for free will1 (at least with respect to the relationship between the will and the willed act).
Posted 01/28/10 - 04:20 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
I just came to think of a funny issue in support of Free Will. Everyone knows proving Free Will means something big. The question is, would you shed the last 10 years of your (natural) life-span (80 instead of 90) to prove it? I think I would! I can provide these reasons for it: proving Free Will, die with good mental health and die with relatively good physical health. In this way, I can have the possibility to show that the mind is Free to do with the body as it pleases. Cool, what!? This on top of a philosophical life, just great!
(It's presumed that death takes place with overdose of anesthetics or the willful contraction of a lethal condition.)
I think this example separates Free Will from Determinism by the fact that we don't necessarily have to go all the way! We don't have to have kids. We don't have to do our best. We don't have to work like dogs. We don't have to be nice. We don't have to be creative. We don't have to spend our time wisely. So on...
Can God know what it is like to ride a bike? - An argument for the nonexistence of
God from the incompatibility of attributes
Posted 01/28/10 - 05:39 PM: forums.philosophyforums.com
By Ozeu, quote: "Can God know what it is like to ride a bike?" Yes, God can know it through us, our souls!
Pro and Con Arguments of (Assisted) Suicide
Posted: Tue Feb 02, 2010 11:58 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
Examination! Time for "inquisition"!
I've made this topic because I think there are some (really) disgusting or stupid arguments against (Assisted) Suicide.
First of all, those who seriously argue for the right to (Assisted) Suicide (A)S seems to have the greatest integrity of the subject they're speaking of. Necessarily, those who oppose it, are on the outside of the situation, but may very well have been considering (Assisted) Suicide in the past.
Now, one person, Simone, argues in favour:
1. People like to have the possibility to die, (A)S, if they are in great pain and are bound to die (terminally ill).
2. People like to have the possibility to die, (A)S, if they are losing their mind (fx. Alzheimer's).
3. People like to have the possibility to die, (A)S, if they are in great mental pain/distress to which there's no hope and there's no-one willing to significantly change the situation.
4. Combination of two or more of 1., 2. and 3.
5. People should have the possibility to (A)S so that people can't be kept as virtual slaves anymore or forced to compromise on themselves to that extent.
6. People should have the possibility to (A)S so that people aren't forced to compromise on themselves to any extent (by 1., 2., 3. and 4.), calling the situation for what it is, making the possibility to (A)S possibly less restrictive.
7. There's more dignity in dying reasonably healthy and able (by/implied by X. in post #4 on the PF forum).
8. If I have no constructive role in society, being an adult, and I have the urge to commit suicide. It should be my right to commit this suicide or else I might get involved with illegal guns and homicide(s). Being an adult involves knowing what's best for yourself as you are closest to yourself and clearly then, I'm ethically/lawfully entitled to choose my destiny of suicide in my own opinion. Therefore, also, I demand it!
9. We should allow people to die by 1. and 2., possibly also by 3., 5. and 6. because it's the decent approach to the matters (by Apathy Kills in post #18 on the PF forum). There's a certain power in using the word, "decent", here and I'd like you to contemplate this.
10. The fact that people are driven down to basic instincts, into corners of despair, forced to compromise on themselves is necessarily leading to unnecessary friction and unhealthy tendencies in society. (A)S should therefore be allowed! (I think this is slightly different than 4. and 5.)
11. Acknowledging point 5. of the opposition, I do still think the defacto performance of society in telling people to "get out of the way" in a possibly hidden and cruel manner (if nothing else then implicitly by use of threats and fear) is true whether this is unexpressed or not (because I can think of such thought as having existence, plausibly).
(It should be noted that assisted suicides if they become legal, always are qualified (by whatever requirements), assisted suicides. This is implicit, but now it's explicit!)
One person, Peter, argues against:
1. People should not have the possibility to die, (A)S, because of (my) (presumably) view of the sanctity of life.
2. People should not have the possibility to die, (A)S, because (unfounded) "it's the wrong signal to give".
3. In the case of older people, they may (mis-) perceive their burden on family and friends in an unproportionate way and thus wrongly requesting, wanting or actually committing suicide.
4. There simply is no unbearable/painful situation and therefore all suicides are wrong.
5. By allowing people suicide, one may give a (possibly subtle) signal that people should "get out of the way" and consequently devalue the human life. Therefore, suicide should not be legal. (This may likely be the real argument of 2. while 2. is just a "social" signal of ambiguity.)
6. By denying people (assisted) suicide, one (unfounded) prevents possibly a number of suicides. Therefore, suicide should not be legal. (By atightropewalker in post #47.)
(Note. If one allows one suicide, it doesn't necessarily mean that you allow one more suicide. It can be that one "palliative" assisted suicide is prevented or that one actual suicide is prevented. Either way, assisted suicides can't be said to necessarily have a bearing on the total number of suicides, actual or possible.)
It seems to me to be common to somehow discredit the person who wants to commit suicide by being in doubt of the person's intelligence, sanity or cognition of circumstances.
I'd like you to add arguments to either of these two people. I'd also like you to list possible hidden motives with either of these two persons.
Like this:
Hidden, Peter, "I like the fact that people die in severe pain and I also like the melancholy of thinking so."
Hidden, Peter, "I like the fact that people go through great pains before getting finally getting it done in all sorts of funny ways. Heck, it's a jungle out there and I'm an explorer!"
Hidden, Peter, "If we give people the possibility to (A)S, people can't be kept as virtual slaves anymore or forced to compromise on themselves to that extent."
Consequently, I also like you to note the possibilities of Simone having hidden motives and the very nature of them.
PS: I also note that the President of the Norwegian Doctor's Association is against (A)S and that other doctors (tossing in the "authority" and "status") also are usually in favour, citing Hippocratic Oath. This is in no way anything objectional and one is entitled the view, but still... (and silent waters run deep).
PS2: If I, by this, get to inform people and also get to sway opinion into being in favour of (A)S, taking the correct (ethical) view on the issue according to myself, I'll be a very happy person!
Posted: Wed Feb 03, 2010 10:26 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
I also like to point out the usual ordeal of suicides. You know, people sobbing and complaining about losing someone beloved, but where are the f**king stories of these (deprived) people who commit suicides? Am I supposed to think they killed themselves because of some illusion? Hah, no way! If I'm supposed to think about suicide, it's the freaking last thing, I think about! I think it's so bloody clear, but people just shut up out of politeness or something. Psychiatry should have rife possibilities on telling people what kind of conditions that drive people into suicide, but do they? F**king never!
Objectively, every possible argument in the discussion of (A)S will take effect and thus be effectuated or denied.
You may find this interesting: "Autopsy of a Suicidal Mind
Edwin S. Shneidman, Ph.D., 2004, Oxford University Press.
Autopsy of a Suicidal Mind is a uniquely intensive psychological analysis of a suicidal mind. In this poignant scientific study, the author assembles an extraordinary cast of eight renowned experts to analyze the suicidal materials, including a ten-page suicide note, given to him by a distraught mother looking for insights into her son's tragic death. Each of the eight experts offers a unique perspective and the sum of their conclusions constitutes an extraordinary psychological autopsy. This book is the first of its kind and a remarkable contribution to the study of suicide." I note that this is from 2004 (why not 1985?).
Important:
People may say that they don't subscribe to all or some of the points or that they certainly not subscribe to the hidden motives (of some people). Their very subscription may very well be so, but this doesn't undercut the fact that their position may support it, objectively! Undeniably then, every possible argument in the discussion of (A)S will take part and thus be effectuated or denied. It should on the other hand, incline them to take part in the debate of preventing this kind of vicious thinking or act in different ways to prevent suicide altogether. Clearly, they will fail to prevent the possibility of such attitudes and I think the massive problem of suicide and its origins are too great to make any solid impact on the matter by practical action. Surely then, this impels a certain kind of dissemination of information. Has Simone won?
By examining the reasons for suicide, it can become a right to commit suicide. Open discussions will decide the laws in the various legislative domains/states and nations. This right can be qualified by fulfilling a set of requirements. I also think if people have a real chance to commit suicide legally, they will embark on a different procedure in relation to family and friends. There's also a chance that family and friends will care more and be more alert to factors leading to suicidal tendencies and the whole debate may also take on better characteristics.
Posted: Thu Feb 18, 2010 11:14 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Following the pattern of abortion that must be said to be very successful if you look closely on the statistics (leading to more: well being of kids, quality time, time for attention and love and so on), excluding, of course, the Christian conservatives (for them, we go the Hell all the same), I think this can turn out well for legalised (assisted) suicides too, that it gets accepted among the greater parts of the population, that for some, suicide by medicines is a good solution to sickness and other. There's nothing in the way for the possibility that near, dear people can take part in one's departure from life. The very (A)S can represent dignity in many ways, not to say fill many empty spaces (to make society "complete").
Posted: Sat Sep 25, 2010 11:24 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I think legalising suicide has the capacity to slash the "doctors'" vile, perverse, gruesome "games" quite heavily to put it bluntly (despite their, the medical doctors, Hippocratic oath)!
Posted: Thu Jan 13, 2011 5:28 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
The final death to the Con-side of legalising (assisted) suicide:
The Hippocratic Oath poses in NO way any more charity toward anti-suicide than the charity of those who are in favour because both sides may equally say that they support the best humanity and the best dignity of it.
Thus, the mere uttering of a certain "devotion" to dignity is no point as such! Therefore, "I claim to follow the Hippocratic Oath" is just a blow in the air in this sense/relation!
Comment on Goodness - Plain perception!
Posted: Thu Feb 18, 2010 10:56 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
It's absolutely stupid to quarrel over goodness! It's an ethical duty to rise to absolutely best and make the best of yourself. To say that another person shouldn't have more goodness than oneself is actually counter to intelligence! Cheers!
The square circle? Alternation like Riemann!
Posted: Fri Apr 02, 2010 3:59 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
Apropos a square circle:
Hypothetically and "crazy", if a square could be a round object, its four corners would meet at a point on this round object!
You can view this in the vein of Riemann who defines a curved surface triangle to have a total of 270 degrees combined angle as opposed to the usual 180 degrees of a flat triangle! Likewise, it should be possible to define a whole square to be round like that. Although, you don't get the bent square, you get the impression of a flat surface with a point in the center and the meeting four edges that line in towards it. This circle then hides a sphere that's a Riemann-bent square. Cool? Conclusion: I, by this, can hold two views to the best of the possibility of creating square circles, in my view, that are, of course, the 3-D object of the sphere and the 2-D object by the circle, both representing squares in their own right as far as I can envision such squares. These are contrary to traditional views, perhaps, but I still find it cool to have drawn such "crazy" objects.
Scientific Explanation of Person
Posted: Fri Apr 30, 2010 10:32 pm; forum.philosophynow.org
Besides, who I am may not be an accident at all, but follows beautifully down the family tree of life and genetics, from ancient ancestors to my parents (and to myself) today...
The Fountain - Obliteration of controversy by functionalism.
Posted: Wed May 19, 2010 12:18 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Please think of an art exhibition where there are several art objects. Now, when you come to the Fountain you find this pissoir along with a sink by my idea and there are details/posters explaining the context and history of this.
So, I suggest that if you place this pissoir along with this bare metal sink made with only function in mind, you do indeed destroy the Fountain as a comment to the art world and I think this may be something to think about because it restores art as being art, the strenuous effort of artistic expression. Therefore, the sink obliterates the Fountain/pissoir as being a destructive comment to art.
Wikipedia information on "The Fountain" by Duchamp.
Posted: Fri Jun 04, 2010 10:04 am UTC; forum.philosophynow.org
To finish this completely:
the text on a suitable poster or board should be this,
title of the exhibition segment, "This is not art! Comment to art and The Fountain! - Obliteration of controversy by functionalism"
The additional actions should be carried out on my contrasting object:
while "The Fountain" is thus titled and signed R. Mutt I now call the sink "Sink to the Ground and Hello Major Tom" and I sign it with I. Bowtoyou!
Posted: Sat Jun 05, 2010 1:44 pm UTC; forum.philosophynow.org
I try to envision the presentation of almost any bare metal sink. It should be no problem to imagine such a sink from your own home placed next to a pissoir at an art exhibition.
This is only a simple objection and an attempt to draw a line in encircling some good advice or norms on what can be considered art to any extent.
I don't deny people the right or promote such a denial of right for people to be absolutely free to regard or present whatever they like as art/aesthetics. As such, this view of mine is purely subjective, a view people may or may not agree with.
I don't want to or can make any more points to this thread. The further work here is actually the work on presenting this as a part of an art exhibition and I'll consider this depending on what contacts I make in that regard.
Posted: Sat Jun 05, 2010 1:55 pm UTC; forum.philosophynow.org
Regarding the Fountain by Duchamp, I wonder if it's a social comment on a muttonhead, making us associate the "art" that takes place when a muttonhead is assaulted for being a muttonhead and thus the whole ramble that follows of shit, concluded by the spilling of grained remains of this muttonhead down the drain to the sewer.
As such, the "fountain" of sh*t may be this "Fountain" from Duchamp! What do you think? Is he playing a point on social realism here, ironic or laconic or whatever?
Posted: Fri Jun 18, 2010 8:07 pm - UTC; forum.philosophynow.org
One can plausibly argue that the Mona Lisa by Da Vinci is always recognisable everywhere as art while this pissoir or this brick or my sink will certainly not at all pass as art eveywhere in its nakedness! Finishing line...?
It's worth paying attention to these "factors":
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Found_art
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stuckism
http://www.stuckism.com/stuckistmanifesto.html
You should pay special attention to the sentence,
"pt. 5. Art that has to be in a gallery to be art isn’t art."
So there you are, on one point, I'm in agreement with the Stuckist movement!
The Worth of Philosophy
Posted: Thu May 20, 2010 1:14 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
If I'm to give you my best opinion on the worth of philosophy, it's this. As far those descriptions are good for something to you is up to you, but philosophy generally carries itself by its virtue of importance. If it's no longer, it becomes a matter of historical fact of human activity and reasoning. Cheers!
The duplication of person - Personal Identity
Posted: Thu May 20, 2010 6:15 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I've come to think about something on the duplication of person:
A comment on being copied to another one of yourself. If you are indeed being copied into another then one can surely say that only one would have the real impression of being one in the world while the copy would only have a real impression of being two, no matter how you put it. So, being copied into another would of course fool the copy, but the one who's copied would always be oneself.
The stuff is hypothetical, yet it can be written this way, I think.
The Turing Test
Posted: Tue Jun 01, 2010 4:22 pm UTC; forum.philosophynow.org
I'm curious as to what the Turing test is good for.
On the one hand you have this computer set-up that's programmed semantically by a number of programmers. On the other you have this semantic (naturally) one person. Between these two, the computer and the person, another person is asked if this person can separate the machine from the human, the person.
So if one considers this from the two year old to the hundred year old, being the span of the age of this person who is to determine the person from the computer, the older person naturally has a greater range of questions to ask than the younger person, usually, because age means greater reflection.
Naturally, the older person does this better than the younger (you may deduct the very oldest).
If you in addition to this give a time limit for making the question, like 10 minutes, I think it's reasonable to say that this gets severely much more difficult. So if one is combining the very young age with a relative short time-limit to ask the questions, I think it's fair to suggest that a considerable number of people will fail the test, being unable to separate the person from the semantically programmed computer if it's comprehensive enough.
So what is the Turing test supposed to prove? What is its significance? The person and the programmers are semantically indistinguishable. That is, the computer system may even prove more advanced than the person if one puts enough programming into it. Sure, one can point to the possibility for actually being able to present a computer system that can answer like a person can or even better, but this is already done and is surely matching the younger people in combination with the time-limit.
My conclusion is that the Turing test is of no significance (anymore) since the programming possibilities are so vast!
Approaches to Sets
Posted: Wed Jun 23, 2010 5:56 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Note: you should beware of the differences between statistics, probability and prediction and the possible sets of investigation, ie. infinite sets (fx. by Cantor), unknown sets and partially known sets, both being possibly finite or possibly infinite, and known, finite sets.
In economy, also, you may think broadly of two scopes of growth, sales and product improvement and the generation/development of new products. This is only within the existing corporate structure, so in addition...
So both economical analysis and the classical natural science analyses can or will be incredibly hard to get right because of the unknown factors that may contribute.
Laws and Descriptions
Posted: Wed Jun 23, 2010 6:09 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
The issue of laws and descriptions can be complicated. Sometimes you want the descriptions to have the same power as expressions (mathematical) of laws and other times, the laws are being used as mere descriptions for something, being less or more accurate.
So instead of being in conflict between laws and descriptions and statistical expressions, it's just to keep an open mind for everything you want to describe and how you want to do it. Just make certain it is sound work!
Argument Against Stupidity or Ethical Ignorance
Posted: Sun Jun 27, 2010 3:52 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
It's both feasible and plausible that human kind is or has been capable of destroying the possibility of human life on Earth (by nuclear weapons, first and foremost). Such an act must be seen as stupid as it will definitely cut short a future of more intelligent and brighter situation for all of human kind (extremely: for this evolution or strand of human kind if not the same evolves around again). Thus stupidity is what possibly brings an end to humanity if anything! You must therefore look to it that you act intelligently!
Implicitly, by this argument, it is indeed an ethical imperative to be pro-active, to mind for your intelligence and to stand up to mental challenges so that you rise above the stupid for sure!
Posted: Sun Jun 27, 2010 6:50 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Dictionary.com:
stu·pid·i·ty
* /stuˈpɪdɪti, styu-/ [stoo-pid-i-tee, styoo-]
–noun, plural -ties
1. the state, quality, or fact of being stupid.
2. a stupid act, notion, speech, etc.
Stupidity is certainly not only the acting against one's own intentions! Stupidity is also, commonly to act against one's own good by some screwed up ideas!
Wittgenstein's Beetle Box
Posted: Sun Jun 27, 2010 6:42 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
From Wikip.:
Quote: "Wittgenstein's beetle [referring specifically to §293 of W.'s PI]
Another point that Wittgenstein makes against the possibility of a private language involves the beetle-in-a-box thought experiment.[21] He asks the reader to imagine that each person has a box, inside of which is something that everyone intends to refer to with the word "beetle". Further, suppose that no one can look inside another's box, and each claims to know what a "beetle" is only by examining their own box. Wittgenstein suggests that, in such a situation, the word "beetle" could not be the name of a thing, because supposing that each person has something completely different in their boxes (or nothing at all) does not change the meaning of the word; the beetle as a private object "drops out of consideration as irrelevant".[21] Thus, Wittgenstein argues, if we can talk about something, then it is not private, in the sense considered. And, conversely, if we consider something to be indeed private, it follows that we cannot talk about it." [The references pertain to the Wikip. page.]
While this is true in some sense, we know that the parameters are known for this "Beetle Box"! How much out of life's parameters can you possibly go? How much can you fantasise and still keep meaning in place/communicate meaning? I believe there are limits to both meaningful reasoning and that there are unspecified limits to ideas in general too.
When we refer to people and their lives, we commonly think about their backgrounds to make it relevant. The conclusion must be that the "Beetle Box" is not so mysterious as one likes to think!
Posted: Mon Jun 28, 2010 12:04 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Of course, the words "tree"/"park with sculptures" (fx. The Vigeland Sculpture Park) can be different to everyone. Yet, when two people stand close to a tree/are in a park with sculptures, they do share the reference, no matter how "private" the impression is. Besides, I think it's conceivable that both persons are able to re-share, by narrative and of course without actually being there, this experience of this tree/park with sculptures, if not drawing it!
Posted: Mon Jul 19, 2010 9:30 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
People have been, IMO, thinking about them more wildly in the past, beyond reality[/less analytic]. I just like to point out the difference of being a 20 people serial killer and being this serial killer by fantasy. Besides, the mortal lives are always founded in objective circumstances and their/our fantasies only go that far as I've written. Novel or not, I don't know...
Epistemology of Logics
Post subject: Epistemology of Logics PostPosted: Sun Aug 08, 2010 11:16 pm
Epistemology of Logics should be finished at the descriptive level before it enters the logical structure.
Thus a pink Sphinx, being a toy figure for children exists because there is such a toy, while the mythical Sphinx does not exist other than as a concept (of language, myths).
It's therefore wise to keep the Logical structure apart from the Epistemological task (that's completed before the assumptions enter the logical structure/argument).
Post subject: Re: Epistemology of Logics PostPosted: Wed Aug 11, 2010 2:56 pm
The ontology of the toy is definite as opposed to the metaphysical Sphinx which according to the myth may be able to do a lot of stuff, like flying, very much unlike the Sphinxes of Egypt. Ok?
It's a small task to go from "individuals" to propositions, like "mythical Sphinx" nicely turns to "there is a mythical Sphinx"! Are you playing with me? Don't you think I understand what I write?
Besides, the OP relates to three articles from AP Martinich's book of Phil. of Lang. and these are B. Russell's "On Denoting", PF Strawson's reaction to it and K. Donnellan's Reference and Definite Descriptions (1966) in that vein. I'm uncertain about this third article, but I'll make it clear to you later. [Edit2, 13.08.2010:] You can also add Quine's (Ch. 1:) On What There Is (from From a Logical Point of View). [End of edit.] [Another edit.] Except Quine, these articles file under Reference and Descriptions by Martinich. [End edit.]
[Edit, 12.08.2010:] You may also think that Logics is all about symbols, but what I like to point to is the Universe of Discourse of Logics that may be easily overlooked by some, ie. beginners, popular readers. So the Epistemology point enters here, UoD. I'll clarify in greater detail as this may look a little confused and blurred. [End of edit.]
Post subject: Re: Epistemology of Logics PostPosted: Fri Aug 13, 2010 7:47 pm
It may very well be the case, but I like to view this in relation to the above mentioned articles...
(PS: I'm about to look over the articles "shortly" to widen the clarification and definitely come across with some point unless the whole thing proves futile...)
[Edit, Unsp.:] I've added "K. Donnellan's Reference and Definite Descriptions (1966)" and "Except Quine, these articles file under Reference and Descriptions by Martinich". [End edit.]
[Edit, Unsp.:] (PS2: I'm also wondering whether I'm wrong in thinking it may go into the Logics section, but give me some time and let me make the attempt/case. (Nevertheless, I do think that most of the lines written so far actually do fit into the Logics category.) [End edit.]
Post subject: Re: Epistemology of Logics PostPosted: Wed Nov 03, 2010 1:32 am
When it comes to the epistemological task of acquiring knowledge, primary sources are usually the most sought. This is very much so by lawyers, historians and journalists.
I find that also the commoner is best provided by primary sources. Thus the corruption of information happens largely due to sloppiness and lenient attitudes.
This is in relation to these 4 articles, but now that I've reread "On Denoting", I find that most is done by the former posts and that most lies in being accurate on matching the name/label and the description, yet the famous social play always has its say!
Post subject: Re: Epistemology of Logics PostPosted: Tue Nov 16, 2010 2:11 am
I'm not going to diminish B. Russell's "On Denoting" because it has been the forerunner for quantification logics and in this article, the existential claims. It's thus pioneering work. It also comments on Meinong's logic by its denoting which is primarily what the article is about. In addition, come these 3/4 articles. Even though, Russell mentions that one should acquaint oneself with the alleged fact under discussion, the equivalent of my epistemology emphasis, I see the opportunity to undercut (that is, to present a "lowest common multiple" for) all 4/5 articles by the OP's entry. (Some of the status on Russell's paper has been uttered by my professor in Phil of Lang., prof. Olav Asheim.)
I'll relate specifically to every article and I'll make the specification univocal!
First out, Russell's:
If there is a king in France, this king is bald -Assumption
There is a confirmation of a king in France (by acquaintance) -Formally Assump.
There is a confirmation that this king is bald (by acquaintance) -Formally Assump.
---------------------------------
The king of France (existing now) is bald -Concl. (rather irrefutably)
I think confirmation can be put as witness or evidence in the UoD if you prefer.
[Edit, 16.01.2011:] Added "lowest common multiple". (Not reported by RSS.)
The Conditions for Abolishment of Ethics as a Philosophical Discipline
Posted: Wed Aug 18, 2010 5:48 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I've been wondering if Dr. Sam Harris is right about ethics as mere psychology. I think it's plausible that he's at least partly right! (I'm also wondering if this has been said/written by myself while in the ethics semester at university in 2000.) But here it goes: If this is not about priorities, ethically, beyond the moment Utopia takes effect, it should be plausible that ethics is merely psychology and some more! So what does morality mean as expressed by ethics if it all comes down to being a healthy and happy person? Isn't this the fact in case it is true that the natural sciences (and possibly in combination with the social sciences, incl. psych) that ethics is "useless"/not necessary as own discipline in philosophy? (I consider psychology/neurology natural science in this writing, also.) Abolish ethics in philosophy?
Posted: Wed Aug 18, 2010 6:31 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
My question is however, do you seriously imply that psychology doesn't know what health and happiness is when it's conducted in normative terms? Turning it a little, I don't think physicists get that much (useful) input from the philosophers these days! As such I think you fail to address these three issues: Utopia, scientific confirmation of health and happiness. You are therefore not entirely on the subject, I think.
Posted: Thu Aug 19, 2010 3:01 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Metadigital writes: "Isn't one of the major points of philosophy to try and figure out what things like happiness are? With psychology alone, wouldn't any explanation end up being mechanistic or reductionist? Wouldn't it have to attempt to explain these things in terms of brain chemistry, behavioral patterns, or cognitive mechanisms? Would that give us a complete picture? I'm skeptical of that. What would guide psychology? Where would it go? How would it benefit us? Why bother with it? It seems to me like there's a lot of things that psychology can't tackle alone without the help of philosophy. I think this applies to all the sciences."
I write: The question is if science is capable of answering ethics in its entirety until Utopia? If Utopia is achieved, what does ethics mean beyond that other than considering priorities like whether to go base-jumping or surfing and other priorities of insignificance (because one lives in Utopia)? Isn't Utopia very much achievable by science, you think? I think it's plausible we can achieve Utopia even by a severe stagnation in today's science, we have what we need! Now, I'm not going to speculate if psychology can answer ethics alone because the question isn't principally important to this topic. Perhaps you can raise it under the Phil. of Science? Where would psychology go? Everywhere that's relevant for psychology to go until psychology contains a complete explanation or has reached explanatory exhaustion according to possibilities. Subject as such needs no "guidance", it just needs development! My dear, where is philosophy itself going to go in case it needs "guidance"? Exactly the same answer again! A subject gives itself once it's clear that it's possible to develop it. You should remember how much that used to be considered philosophy in the past until it branched out into various scientific disciplines.
Posted: Thu Aug 19, 2010 9:32 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Let me tell it in a different way: Science should by this point be very much able to determine good phyical health and good mental health. It should also be able to determine if people are happy in a healthy way (not enjoying crime like rapes and other violations of people).
Now that we are able to do this, by fMRI and all the rest, shouldn't we just stick to the rules and regulations that fulfill these objectives the best? Of course, we should! Otherwise, we support what we should kill, the crime, the unethical!
If you think about it, everyone likes to discover truth, to develop, to puzzle, to play, to be curious, to make enterprises, to display themselves by who they are and their skills and knowledge in general. So, is there any mystery in determining what the obstacle is in achieving this for potentially every single person on the planet? Certainly not! And we don't need ethics to do it either!
So to end this: give me one example that require ethics to be solved! I'll answer every one of your questions within the scope of health, both phy. and men., and happiness in the scope of opportunities!
Posted: Fri Aug 20, 2010 2:08 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Metadigital writes:
"1. America sends a lot of food to countries where starvation is a huge problem. This is done out of concern for the well being of those people. The populations of the countries that receive this aid constantly grow just above the level of food available. Is continuing to send food to these rising populations (who are now dependent on aid) ethical?"
I think this kind of problem may be one of the simplest. Without touching the philosophical vocabulary concerning ethics, I think one should send sufficient food to food deprived populations as well as enter discussion on what is the desired population level in these areas/countries or this area/country. In addition, one may want to facilitate about changes that get the problem areas or countries out this cycle. All in all, the area of jurisdiction enter some kind of general vote on the country's future on a number of issues which are all reasonable, like a key issue of population. According to this, planning takes place to make permanent and self-sustaining changes. I mean, one has over 260 nations in the world where one country should be a good example to this area/country in question. Do I need to go further?
Metadigital writes:
"2. In a similar situation, America sends financial aid to foreign countries that have weak infrastructures. This financial aid, of course, is given on a conditional basis. Because these countries develop an infrastructure that relies on American aid to avoid an internal collapse, they become dependent this aid to the point of damaging their own sovereignty over their affairs. Is this an ethical practice for America?"
The aid is all well and good! I think you are unclear on why this money damages their sovereignty. Rather (US) America should facilitate a richer financial life for this nation in addition, perhaps with the help of other nations as well. It's clear that countries that receive financial help they become dependent on, are in a situation where more development is needed and to deny this extra help is to waste resources to a deficient country, obviously! A well working country is a country that usually generates a surplus in the eyes of the world, in being hospitable, having exciting culture, generating fine industry and minds. All in all just stays healthy and being a civilised place to the world, including taking deep participation into Res. and Dev. and knowledge business (incl. education). This is also without any philosophical ethics jargon!
Metadigital writes:
"3. To stop picking on America, and to illustrate a real world event that took place; A hospital is choosing between two people to receive a new kidney. They have a list that they usually go by, but a private individual has offered $1,000,000 to be placed at the top of the list. This rich individual is a heavy drinker and will likely die in the next few years anyway, but the money can be used to upgrade medical facilities and benefit more people (keep in mind that this is the early 20th century!). The person who is actually at the head of the list is young with many more years of potential life left. What is the ethical decision to make? (I'll post the decision actually made after your reply.)"
1. It's unknown whether the hospital actually needs more equipment and thus I see no definite use for the extra money: the kidney goes to the young man.
2. The other way may be that the hospital needs the equipment dearly (in life saving terms and not plastic surgery) and may help 10 extra people every year from dying (far outweighing the young man's extra years). Thus: the kidney goes to the rich man. It should also be noted that is without corruption and that the transplant list is without absolute rules! This is also without any philosophical ethics jargon!
There you have them. You may object by saying this is ethics and thereby philosophy, but I say of course that this is ethics solved by purely scientific considerations! There is not one word that pertains to philosophy, inherently, in them!
Gravestone for Communism (until Utopia)
Posted: Mon Aug 16, 2010 1:38 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I've earlier written these on Philosophyforums.com where you can find the original writings. I find them to be so striking that I post them here as well:
[Dead for all foreseeable future?]
Posted Jul 25, 2009 - 11:11 AM:
I find that capitalism is better at controlling corruption than communism. That is, capitalism is more fault tolerant. While communism almost demands that people are like angels, capitalism can deal with a relatively large amount of not so good people.
Besides, in capitalism people can settle with less and be pleased with it while those who want it can work themselves to death and enjoy their fortune from it. This is almost impossible in communism, I think.
Posted Aug 14, 2009 - 7:00 PM:
I want to mention:
- communism focuses on work of people and this can be way harder to make a just issue of in that system
- capitalism focuses on money and money can be made to adjust for all kind of relationships, from capitalisation of ideas to the amount of stress from work
Who is supposed to kick the hardest work in communism without having advantages for doing it? If workload is supposed to be equal, should one make elaborate psychologies of work to make sure nobody stresses, carry more workload, than others? Communism seems to me to be more complex to incorporate.
Posted Feb 6, 2010 - 12:09 PM:
Soviet Union has been marked by two very bad ideas: Communism and Atheism!
Posted: Mon Aug 16, 2010 11:20 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
China is not any communist country anymore, mind you. It has officially described itself as socialist some years ago and even then their communism may just be a kind of "communism" through which their need for control in overcoming severe problems and a vast population may have called for it.
Posted: Thu Aug 19, 2010 2:47 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
It's true that China has only one party, but they do elect electives to the "party congress" and I also happen to believe that there's more than 1 possible candidate in most or all of these elections to the "party congress" beside having the possibility to vote blank or not to vote at all, going into some kind of system opposition, trying to change the political machinery, at least!
The elections? You will have to check, but I think the last has been reported within a year or two. Thanks for asking the question, Wootah. One thing is for certain, China does not fulfill the the communist ideal of everyone being equally rich or poor, quite the opposite. There are quite large economic differences in China. It's true though that they have only one party and that this is typical for a communist country, perhaps even for a social one as they describe themselves as.
Posted: Thu Aug 19, 2010 8:59 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
The type of democracy (in case it really is) is one that goes along a line of culture and a certain scope of politics and it is of this kind, I think a one-party democracy can be effective. That you want progress and control over this fast and steady and thus the political system is set up as it is. Remember that the Chinese political system is handling 1,2 Billion people and a good deal of these are quite poor! So what should one do? I think the Chinese have chosen a fine middle way, preserving own culture and emphasising the important aims beside of this.
You can look up yourselves the democracies of USA with its 310 million people and downwards...
Philosophy as Science - Now Free Linguistic Science!
Posted: Thu Sep 02, 2010 9:46 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
[Philosophy is hereby suggested to be renamed to Free Linguistic Science]
What are your thoughts on this? On viewing philosophy as science, seriously?
This is in respect to the thread: Scientific vs Philosophical Method.
[Edit:] http://forum.philosophynow.org/viewtopic.php?f=5&t=4502. I see no difference in the various "philosophical" investigations to the disciplines of philosophy in contrast to the HDM of the natural sciences. The "Phd" is also philosophical in a sense, but is not necessarily related to philosophy other than as an honorary title for significant/"deep" work brought to a subject. We'll see where this will go! Cheers! [End of edit.]
Posted: Fri Sep 03, 2010 3:46 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
You should remember that philosophy means just this, love of truth or love of wisdom. Philosophy today is exactly this, the study of well defined fields/disciplines and I see no need to keep an umbrella that classically denominates a love of something. No, this seems rather ancient and I think it's time to move on...
The other sciences will have to continue to live their lives...
"You Can’t Prove a Negative"
Posted: Thu Aug 26, 2010 3:47 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Yes you can! By not proving a positive! That is, as far into the work of analysis, you are "proving" a negative everything you must admit to not finding anything under a certain scope of research, whatever this may be! The LHC looking for the Higg's boson or something else... Dr Michael V. Antony writes in his article, The New Atheism - Where’s The Evidence?, that "2. You Can’t Prove A Negative" and I disagree with this, obviously, in naming a "category"/research "null"/"nothing"/"zero finding". [Edit:] It's as simple as identifying an empty place! [End of edit.] [I've formerly called this the Casting Principle, ie. that of a piece, something has been stamped out and that the remaining substance is the very thing.]
Posted: Thu Aug 26, 2010 6:22 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Should I write down a deduction for you given some premises? Would it help? I am fully aware of the Paradox of Ravens.
Example for your thoughts:
You look for a highly valuable object on a public square. Well, the square is empty. There is nothing there that's highly valuable to you ie. golden necklace by Gucci or some. So you have proven by time and place that there is not a highly valuable object for you in this public square! Comprende?
Posted: Thu Aug 26, 2010 5:38 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
...But it definitely means snow doesn't exist where they have been up to this point ie. there has not been snow "here", place, in this period, time. And this is indeed proven! However, this "negative" usually is understood in the context of (natural) laws, but even these must have the possibility to be "proven", confirmed - so consequently I'd say one should be able to "prove" a negative law as well because they need to apply to reality and they need a possible set-up of scientific equipment which the absurdly asserted so-called laws never will have the possibility of because they are simply false!
Posted: Fri Sep 10, 2010 5:18 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I come to think of this crime-scene where the investigators prove that a certain person is not the killer, ie. police investigators prove this negative all the time.
Posted: Fri Sep 17, 2010 5:28 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Ever heard of the elimination process? No? You have a set of people who may have committed this crime and then you investigate until the criminal has been found! You rule out the negatives and clinch the guilty!
Posted: Fri Sep 17, 2010 5:37 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
That is, this suspect has been proven to not be the offender, ie. to prove a negative! An alibi enters as a different description and to prove the negative for an alibi is a whole different process, but you know this, don't you?
Posted: Fri Sep 17, 2010 10:10 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
I think of proving a negative in a very limited sense, not implying natural laws or generalisations! What I'm implying, is that in a limited span of time and a limited space, you can prove a negative finding!
F.x. this object in this public space at this time, the suspect who isn't the perpetrator, the finding of a natural law within this scope and with this research equipment and this, "proving a negative" continues in this fashion!
Posted: Wed Sep 29, 2010 6:01 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Ive been thinking some more and I come to believe, hypothetically, under the following assumptions/premises that if we get to know all of the universe, every other universe, and all of science in its utmost precision, we should be able to say why the laws of nature are this way and not any other way. Thus, even for the most radical "negative", that of proving a negative natural law, there may be this kind by this description. Obviously, it's at the very far end, one, perhaps, equal to Heaven, only, possibly, theoretically achievable.
A Reply to An Idea of Subjectivity
Posted: Fri Sep 10, 2010 5:29 am UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Perhaps, "all truths are subjective" can be written because nobody can check on others' views! I.e. it becomes a kind of religious views.
On the other hand, "all truths are subjective", I suggest is a kind of Liar's paradox because if you know that "all truths are subjective" then you know what these views are and you should be able to agree with the most reasonable one.
Or it, "all truths are subjective", is a kind of qualia assertion where it's not possible to determine the judgment passed, yet it passes as truthful and thus objective, afterall.
[Edit, 13.09.2010:]
Socratic Spelunker writes:
..."all truth is subjective" include itself? Is the statement "all truth is subjective" subjective?"
So in the qualia sense, in so far as the (art, fx.) judgments vary absolutely and are expressed in words (objectively), thus this sentence above is not true. The sentence should be ""all truth (in this case) is subjective" doesn't include itself! The statement "all truth (in this case) is subjective" is hereby objective!"
But I believe there are cases where this difference is unexpressed (beyond a certain level) and where the difference is still perceived, yet in an unexplained way, thus "all truth (in this case) is subjective" does include itself! The statement "all truth (in this case) is subjective" is hereby subjective!
[End of edit.]
So here you have my 3 versions of your above sentence, more or less based on your OP.
Posted: Fri Sep 10, 2010 4:11 pm UTC + 1 hour; forum.philosophynow.org
Socratic Spelunker writes:
"If it includes itself, it is false, because it is all-inclusive and absolute. You can't have an objective truth saying "all truths are subjective.""
If you have a fact that says that no views on art are the same, then you do in fact have an objective truth concerning subjectivity, namely one where you find that no-one has similar views in art!
We can hypothetically imagine some simpletons where this is true, that is, their views about art are so crude that they never bother to argue about art deeper than agreement or more deep than a certain complexity. This kind goes against the non-agreement argument of considering arts.
Indeterminacy of Quine
Post subject: Criticism of Quine's Indeterminacy of Language PostPosted: Wed Oct 13, 2010 9:44 am
I'm about to read a translation of Immanuel Kant's Grounding of the Metaphysics of Morals into English. It strikes me that it's possible to say that a sufficient or good translation has to stay within a certain scope! This is what I level against Quine as he appears on my Foe-list. Not only that, but his project of Philosophy seems to be sceptical and of the kind of minimalist philosophy without connecting him with Paul Horwich in any way...
I'm coming back to this, but this project is now open!
Post subject: Re: Criticism of Quine's Indeterminacy of Language PostPosted: Wed Oct 13, 2010 5:03 pm
I'd also like to add that I also think meaning has to lie within this scope. You can't make a Flying Spaghetti Monster from the Bible and you can't make the US American constitution support Nazism. There are clear limits to how far you can extrapolate language before you sound like a lunatic...
So while I am on the limits, Quine is on the possibilities...
I'll see what I get out of it. Until then, my description of Quine stands...
Post subject: Re: Criticism of Quine's Indeterminacy of Language PostPosted: Wed Oct 27, 2010 9:56 pm
A short comment: I've never heard that bilinguists (I know 3 languages to varying degree) report on deficiencies going from one language to another. The bilinguists must be able to communicate in both languages and be meaningful and respectful to the transition, yet I've never heard of a single problem about it! What are these problems supposed to be?
Am I supposed to be unable to translate a New York Times article, perfectly meaningful, to fx. Norwegian? This becomes even more obscene in scientific contexts because one may be forced to say that science in different languages is different, which is absurd!
On the Question of Science - An Important Distinction
Post subject: Re: Can you say that the knowledge about dowsing is science? PostPosted: Wed Oct 13, 2010 12:33 am
The original text: "There's an important distinction to be made here:
It's indeed science to learn about dowsing as something people have believed in or are believing in. Dowsing, in itself, is of course not science. No, it's outright pseudo-science!!"
The heavily edited version is this: By the example of Dowsing, a clear example of pseudo-science, it's important to make the distinction of talking about a phenomenon that people have believed in or are believing in and the act of considering Dowsing as science by writing, ie. not pseudo-science. The issue is that you shouldn't reject anything, but at least consider the issue at hand as a phenomenon that people believe in historically or otherwise or a phenomenon in itself in this former respect. There is a large step from these two earlier points, to enter the belief in something by believing in it as science or knowledge of anything valuable in itself. The wisdom is that some scepticism and a good foundation of knowledge can carry you far!
On the Question of Torture
Post subject: Re: Morality of Water Torture PostPosted: Sun Oct 31, 2010 8:18 pm
I'm so irritated at this. First of all, we are discussing water-boarding without being in a real war scenario! There is not a single nation that has a utilised war-economy as we speak (possibly except Afghanistan and Somalia). There is not a single nation where the population is set in war-state, that is almost all nations or all nations are bustling with the daily business. One is certainly hard pressed to call (the expeditionary) force of USA a determinant for USA in war!
Although, I'm deeply against every form of torture in normal civilian life, I think those agencies concerned with terrorism should be allowed to do it, but I call for some form of transparency on this: number of subjects, eventually names and numbers, judicially followed and accounted for. In this form water-boarding presents the bottom level, ie. no hot irons and other "medieval" means.
In proper war-time, I think I could possibly allow almost everything, but one should be able to remain a person after the torture has been conducted. I wouldn't allow for "monster"-torturers and also there is "decent"/"honest" torture than some other routes one can take.
Conclusion: torture can be accepted to varying degrees according to situation, but never the ill-conceived and "evil" options.
On the Question of Freedom and Control
Post subject: Re: Freedom vs. control. PostPosted: Fri Nov 05, 2010 12:24 am
If freedom is set by privacy and ignorance of person in cases where crime is not committed, I think this is enough freedom for all on the planet. That is, crime is first and foremost confined to private space. Crime can also happen in public, but then at significant risks, by this control regime. (This part is about control!)
The problem arises when dishonest people argue for privacy and absolute freedom (for the sake of possible criminal intent)! That is, absolute freedom meaning the absence of possibility to get caught when one should very much be caught for crime!
I usually refer to the recipe of society for engaging the debate to enter a more realistic picture of crime and not the "pretty" picture that innocent/naive people have. (The Police should be better at the public education on this point.)
So, where are we at? I've been arguing for the Data Storage Directive for a while now, following Singaporean kind of discipline. The point is that all well-intended people should carry through their business effortlessly and that criminal people should run significant risk (if not 100%) with the appropriate punishment.
The issue of Police state is not an issue because it's not compatible with democracy! I fail to see how a Police state can arise with the Democracy being the top premise. The opposition will have to give a credible account for this!
A Practical Guide to Ethics: The Pocket and Cell Theory
Post subject: A Practical Guide to Ethics: The Pocket (and Cell) Theory PostPosted: Mon Jan 24, 2011 4:27 pm
Here it follows:
First the assumption, if one is uncertain about other people's practice of Ethics, one can move away from relying on assumption and go to positive confirmation of other people's ethics, by personal acquaintance and relationship.
Thus, a personal ethics erupts and creates "The Pocket (for the group) Ethics and Cells (personal ethics) for these people inside this group"!!!
[Edit:] [Besides, there is a quite good article in the Mind Journal (issue 475) that is named "Practical Equilibrium: A Way of Deciding What to Think about Morality" by Ben Eggleston, that can be interpreted like this.]
Post subject: Re: A Practical Guide to Ethics: The Pocket (and Cell) Theory PostPosted: Sun Feb 06, 2011 6:37 pm
Now on positive confirmation:
On an ordinary meeting/interview or brief encounter, implicit or explicit,
"I can't say I approve of your personality or your life-history, but you seem to behave normally and say the right words and for this occasion as such, I appreciate it!"
My View on a Theory of Everything
Post subject: Re: General Unified Theory PostPosted: Sun Dec 05, 2010 5:13 pm
I hope for a General Unified Theory to be realised, but it's a long shot! I think the best approach is to try to set definite connections between the various theories!
[Edit, 28.01.2011:] Once these definite connections are made, the next step will be to work inward toward a smaller and smaller kernel of explanation that is able to maintain, theoretically, all these theories that have been connected. [End of edit.]
The Analytic-Synthetic Divide - Against Quine and His Two Dogmas
Post subject: The Analytic-Synthetic Divide - Against Quine and [His] Two Dogmas PostPosted: Fri Feb 18, 2011 5:07 pm
I only need to put on the table the term "Exhaustive Categories" to (re-)make the analytic-synthetic divide valid again.
[Edit:]
I'm not even sure if I need only dichotomies to apply the analytic-synthetic divide. Thus for the concepts of bachelor and husband, we now have gap-closing concepts like boyfriend and couples living together, but who are not married. We also have the players. All in all, the descriptive power of language has closed these gaps and laid out a fine band of exhaustive categories that lets no case go undescribed!
[End of edit.]
[Edit, 19.02.2011:] So, I think now that the visible light spectrum can go into the analytic category. Even then you can start some nominated bottom end by 0 and go upward to 1, i.e., fuzzy logic. The point for the synthetic category, obviously, is to construct larger pictures by the building blocks of the analytic category. Kant uses the classic notions from mathematics where the single numbers are placed in the analytic category, I think, and the combination of numbers, the calculations, into the synthetic category! [End of edit.]
Yes... Quine is still a foe!
General Theory of Arts Demarcation
Post subject: General Theory of Arts Demarcation PostPosted: Sun Feb 20, 2011 12:33 pm
For appreciating art correctly and determining what qualifies as art generally, you need to comply with the following:
Your cognition, and by cognition only, you need to pass psychological normality, i.e., of the kind of IQ-tests, and respect that this is also normative, and in this art evaluation you need to be honest and interested, with the honesty bringing you to the right level of interest (for a valid judgment to obtain).
It may be that Stuckism has this already, but at least I provide a parallel wording.
To the top<
back< [This is taken directly from the original file and is the official information regarding this. The rest is delivered as blog posting.]
New positions in Philosophy of Politics: Cosmopolitanist, Realist, Pragmatist, Idealist (maybe synonymous with Utopian), Patriotism in addition to the two others above! Good?
ReplyDeletePhilosophy of Politics: Multiculturalist (!)
ReplyDeletePhilosophy of Law (as formerly written): Absolutist, Legislationist and Originalist (!)
Philosophy of Business: Minimalist (rather jokingly, as earlier noted) (!)
Concerning the suicide argument here that I think is fairly exhaustive, I'll add my view on Shelly Kagan's perception on Suicide and the right to end one's own life, initally, as one wishes. By his anti-suicide argument he positions himself insensitive toward every grounding of reason the suicide candidate in question ever possibly can have for committing suicide. Therefore, to him, this discussion is over as he refuses to see or can't see whatsoever the other side's argument as life is an absolute joy/reward/pleasure/"miracle" to him! (However, this necessarily includes to assume "the life of a rat", enjoying everything in life, that seems absurd, including the utterance to say that one is pleased with life on a garbage dump outside Mexico City or in the poor parts of Brazil with all its constant threats of this or that nature. I believe very few bother to agree with this man! Symbolically, his argument is very short also, p as premise, p as reiteration and p as conclusion!)
ReplyDeleteThe comment above only relates to the philosophy series on Death given by prof. Shelly Kagan by its release date "09-10-2009" that I interpret to be 10. Sept. 2009. Either way, this reference should be definite!
ReplyDeletePhilosophy of Science: Cumulative Growth of Knowledge Philosopher or Anti-Kuhn.
ReplyDeletePhilosophy of Ethics/Ecology: Deep Ecology Philosopher.
Sorry, it should say Anti-Kuhnian!
ReplyDeleteBare reminder, but please tell the slow-trotting IPCC that there are 3 serious solutions for a better world in the Ecology sense. These are 1. reduction of World population by each and every country's own choice/autonomy (by reducing child births naturally, contracept.), 2. the production of carbon-ice deposited on the arctic poles (or below, in sea, the jury is still out and calculations are not ready yet, I believe even by steady shipping traffic and the last, 3. the conventional, the development of technology to reduce energy-consumption (and regulation of the environment so that's better protected against polluters) and the use of ecology-friendly power-sources, like wind, sun, tidal and so on... Good? (Is the message sent yet? Let me look, please?!)
ReplyDeletePhilosophy of Politics: Secularist (!)
ReplyDeleteNow it's added here as well alongside the Philosophy Blog of mine, http://philosophyblog777.blogspot.com !
Funnily enough, I think I can declare myself Revisionist Standard Model Philosopher under Philosophy of Science. This concerns my final (and not debatable as such) decision on Higgs' Boson and the Graviton. It also concerns my criticism of entering the Gluons into the Standard Model and I think they are to be removed in the future!
ReplyDeleteBecause of course Gluons have their own justification under QCD and are massless that I find to be intolerable (scientific) weaknesses!
I should, though, be obvious that I _welcome_ ALL criticism! When I write "not debatable as such" this simply means that I'm *firm* on my own standing and that I'm unmovable, discussion-wise until opposition has provided a better argument (whatsoever). Welcome to the debating!
A new position in Philosophy of Politics (or union with Political Philosophy) can be this: Accordance Realist Pragmatist Idealist _with the all-important word _Accordance_!!!
ReplyDelete..._with_ "This enters in light of my little notice that pays respect to all of these three concepts in_line, properly!!!"
Note: First written to Facebook 4th May, 2012.
Note on the argument PRO-suicide above: I note the article of Lancet, by http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article/PIIS0140-6736(12)60322-5/abstract , and want to add, as a response to "Restriction of access to means for suicide is important." that restriction is to /normatively/ happen /inside/ the relevant treatment program that is to have definite perfect legal standing and that NO pathology on the side of the psychologist/psychiatrist toward the patient in that "hidden psychopath/hating/gaming" is to be approved, but rather "killed" as soon as it is found (with the psychologist/psychiatrist)!!! There is no way for these academics to ever step outside lawful behaviour and the treatment programs are well-known and according to convention!!! (I also cite the historical burden on these academics to display exactly this lawful behaviour, having had Erich Fromm, Ernst Rudin and Alfred Ploetz in their ranks!)
ReplyDeleteOn ETI further as clarification:
ReplyDeleteClarification: My intelligence theory comes on top of these other three factors, the basic foundation:
1. Diet issues as in staying healthy, eating (accepting some deviation, perhaps) relevant food.
2. Physical exercise, as in having a good pulse band to move in, both for calm and for intensity, during harder working periods when inspiration is peeking or when impportant work is being completed.
3. Mental exercise, being pro-active, toward information, solving puzzles, riddles, having control on "IQ-tests-patterns-for-testing" (not knowing exactly what they are, though) and the sort, i.e., knowing what intelligence is and how the science goes!
Alright, sum is, all in all, 3 groups to care for before my ETI enters as described!
Note: This explanation has first been publicly available under my profile of Leonardo F. Olsnes-Lea while "Issues from the Internet" has formerly been published under my former name, Terje Lea. Please also see the very bottom notice of Copyright symbol and two names for this.
Labels for ETI on the scienceblog777: Bell Curve, ETI, intelligence, IQ, the encumbrance theory of intelligence.
ReplyDeleteIt is my opinion also that Philosophy of Law and Jurisprudence has more or less entered Utopia, and most certainly now with possible filming in the courts by the court systems' themselves to the archives, automatic (moderately) court transcription services by computing, and potentially 4 lie detection instruments in the pockets of serious Police! This goes along with Epistemology that has same standing, of course!
ReplyDeleteLie detectors as programmed feedback to the judges is also a factor for declaring this status to this particular branch of philosophy!
ReplyDeleteTo Philosophical Positions: I "want" to be known, also, for my position of "Anti-Semantics-Romanticism", that is, I oppose those who romanticise over the concept of semantics! This does not exclude the fact that I (deeply) respect the mystery of the soul and the ethics, all in all, in general.
ReplyDeleteI am also a "scope-theorist-translationist" in opposition to Quine "Indeterminacy-Language-Translation"!
I believe the plagiarisation rules are quite strict and this and all other matters of mine, are to comply perfectly!
ReplyDeleteJust to calm down Mr. Ouzu of the Philosophyforums.com, the very title, as also noted inside the link down there is /his/, that is, it should read: "Can God know what it is like to ride a bike?" by Mr. Ouzu. Unless, otherwise and properly cited the words are of course mine! This refers the me being the creator the, /the/, FIRST "Transmission Argument" by radio and photons to the eyes inspiration. of 2004, given the IEP page by a certain Mr. Chris Tucker of New Zealand! Check out yourself! This is now noted.
ReplyDeleteHaving declared myself an "Artificial Language Philosopher" a while ago I have this to add:
ReplyDeleteThe Artificial Language that I follow as matter of philosophy, is a kind of strict, rule following "core" /from/ natural language, also with parantheses for ordering and marking units of meaning, much like one does in sentential logic, in symbolising these same units.
That my logic on Artificial Languages follow programming logics, without the "Java security updates"... ;-)
Under "Positions in Philosophy":
ReplyDeleteFormally settling the question of language philosophy (also including logical contorversies). This is it:
The further development of my position on "Artificial Language Philosophy" is this simplicity, that more or less settles it, is that as the logical connectives enter the artificial language in non-contradictory way and maintaining the strict logical requirements of being consistent, the logical connectives can be read aloud like this fx. "the logical connective NOT" to [entity] "by parantheses" and reading onwards and that this, principally makes Carnap's project crossing the finishing line! Thank you for following me through!
Carnap is the Winner along with the rest of us!
(First to Facebook some hours ago.)
Philosophy of Religion:
ReplyDeleteModern Christian
Moderate Christian
(Christian, but outside the state-Church of Norway since 2003 and unable to re-enter the un-state-Church of Norway in 2012 because of political turmoil rel. to the legal system/human rights violations.)
Scientologist
Ecumenical Philosopher
Deist
(Deism & Christianity = compatible "with Bible belief intact", 10 Comm., the rest)
All-Interpretationist (math. "union-U"), but only the best acc. to sense, pref. my own, also by "The Scientific Bible 2.0 - Commentary to the Bible, All Versions".
By my NDNID, it's also my opinion that Christians and all other reliigous people are committed to being "deists" rather than "theists" because believing in God/Allah/Buddha and the other God-concepts necessarily commit religious people to the 4 entities of Meaning/Ethics/Def. of God/Entailment of Heaven/Reincarnation. Also because belief in God is defended by NDNID and two others.
ReplyDeleteObjections (main or not) to a blunt denial to suicide by fx. Kagan, NYC Univ.:
ReplyDelete- that pains and lunacy are often connected entities, even as psychological fact, that being against suicide and pushing people too, may present the con-side as lenient to lunacy one way or another, in negligence if not coarsely "perverse"...
- the fact that Kagan and others place themselves in the way of others' private situation in terms of pains may come across to most people as unsympathic. Again, we have the possible hidden motives by the con-side. I note also what a fine contribution both the contraception pill is as well as the very abortion (chemical and minor surgery) represent as options to people who need them, apart from these people with big feelings who reject them, analogously!
As with Ganguilhem, Kagan and others "are good in celebrating life", but ultimately fail to effectuate progress for human kind in terms of increased peace, ethics stances/intuitions, democracy and freedom because, simply, one doesn't get anywhere with their positions other than, as shown, probably DOWNWARD!
ReplyDeleteThe further argument to Pro- and Con-Arguments to Assisted Suicide is being developed here and that these additions may not enter here anymore: http://whatiswritten777.blogspot.no/2012/09/pro-and-con-arguments-of-assisted.html .
ReplyDeletePhilosophy of Public Relations:
ReplyDeleteThat under Philosophy of Public Relations (PR), I declare myself
"white-side"/anti-Goebbels.
By this, I also note that (black-side-)Goebbels is a bloody negative study and that one must remember that he has been a core-Nazi-German and all that this brings with a personhood of deep corruption. Despite this, Goebbels must have set into operation such vastness that it would have made Aristotle drool for months after witnessing it. USA has no poss. to object to this position of mine, formal note.
Url: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goebbels .
(I'm sorry that using this page set-up forces you as reader to use Ctrl-f often. I hope still, though, that you find the information here attractive.)
ReplyDeleteHere: About Ctrl - f .
To Friends and Foes of Philosophy:
ReplyDeleteFriend: Alfred Tarski - Service: Logics
Friend: Kurt Friedrich Gödel - Service: Logics, Ontological Proof
- Despite countering the 2 Incompleteness Theorems, there is something else that speaks for Gödel and it is honesty and sincerety. That his work displays dedication.
Pierre Duhem, not well known yet, has a "friend"-side too, by his religious stance and his paper that promotes "Le Bon Sens". That by this careful description he builds on former achievements, which is the right action. Either way, he is only marginally places on the "foe"-list, so there is no... The List isn't that serious, only that I want to mark my positions, also to the philosophers themselves, not only the positions. Fx. one thing is to say "Realism", but what about "Conventionalism" AND Poincare too? The names... Mind them, please!
Friend: Friedrich A. Hayek - Service: Best Philosophy of Economy! And there is no particular other either.
ReplyDeleteGreenspan, of Late, however, has made it evident how Central Bank management should be handled in order to make the economy work for the people.
Formalism as project toward book can be given this title:
ReplyDeleteFormalism - in Being Realist - Science Abiding
(inside book:) in tribulating the success of Formalism!
"Inner note": Formalism is to be known publicly:
Formalism - in Being Realist - Science Abiding
(inside book:) in tribulating the success of Formalism!
Formalism admits NO deficiencies to other aspects of Jurisprudence and Phil. of Law.
Philosophy of Law: Legal Reasoning Closure Principle Philosopher, legal reasoning, being valid, has to comply with logical entailment and that this is minimally the claim that it does, apart from the (many book) examples that it does. (This is only a formal note, not the text for lawyers to actually having to sit and make these logical texts themselves, i.e., to burden them with much extra work.)
ReplyDelete(This is a new position to be known in the World, as with Accordance Realism-Pragmatism-Utopian.)
Under my Logician (suddenly realising why USA has been so consistent in using this label on me), that the Appeal to Common Belief can be said to hold 2: one is the fallacy when it writes out Appeal to Common Belief as Spurious Claim. The other is the Appeal to Common Belief Meaning Credibility or Plausibility, and by this aiding the "common debaters" just this one bit. This last one being usually, when correctly made during the debate toward the very end, the last entered because the debater necessarily must hold then that the discussion has a necessary end, with only one conclusion to carry, the debater's and clearly so too, for everybody to recognise it, given a bit of education.
ReplyDeleteUnder my Set Theory:
ReplyDeleteHere is my solution against the number illusionists or rather Number Idealists:
Numbers are for REAL given that sets are for real and sets need to represent something, in logics given by the existential notation. In math, given by the exact number, usually, given bla, bla, bla...
Therefore, numbers have to be d*mn REAL, without a possibility for doubt!
This places nicely next to my Set Theory in Math that some people see as definitive.
This makes me a Number Realist along with my general position in Mathematics and Logics: the Realist's position.
Thus more, I add force to various people bothering to follow my intellectual path through life in providing intelligence and BEST solutions!
(That I write this out of who I am, MAN! (Without the uncertainty like in puberty.))
This has been noted a while ago given some tech-eyes (state-crime) considerations!
Tarski-Completeness Theorist - New to "Positions".
ReplyDeleteTarski-Completeness Theorist, "citing Finitism to not being any significant problem, as long as "it is controlled" by proper labelling."
(Failure to label - Failure to descriptive side of mathematics) "Labelists", on the other hand go to the Incompleteness Theorists by Gödel and the others in his wake.
Also, all numbers are known, "just write it down!"
The days of "soft science" are history. All is now hard science ((1/2) biology, physics, chemistry, psychiatry, psychology etc.)
ReplyDeleteElse: just science like in Linguistic Science.
Over positions in philosophy
ReplyDeleteSome peculiarities: as Paul M. Churchland considers himself Materialist under Philosophy of Mind whereas one would normally expect the Physicalist position though they are more or less the same. So too, I am the (Tarski) Truth Realist under Truth Theory by Philosophy of Language / Metaphysics whereas one may expect Tarski Truth Redundancy Theorist instead!
This is of no practical importance. The theories stay the same and people probably place me where they like either way.
More to the issue of (Assisted) Suicide: A point more to decide the debate...
ReplyDeleteA sticking point to decide who has the most respect for the topic of this discussion, i.e. to allow eutanasia is as follows:
Given the respect for mental health that equals the respect for life as such so
it follows that, granted the awful pains, unbearable as such, can give rise to vast personality change, undesired, and insanity.
If it is now the case that respect for the person equals the respect for life (and death) then they who are pro-eutanasia have the final say of the matter at hand, whether to allow eutanasia or not.
This can certainly be set up logically as valid deduction ("so do not try it!").
What say you?
(Remember that the debate should be fair / honest and that it is therefore expected that debattantene passes present lie detectors. Well, these lie-detectors 4 different methods simultaneously used, mimicry and eye-dialation, polygraph test, voice stress analyser and (f) MRI for lie pattern in the brain.)
Hi. I've updated this posting now so that it has become far easier to read. I'm sorry that the obvious flaws have persevered for so long. Cheers!
ReplyDeleteProving the negative
ReplyDeleteThe LIGO Experiment has potentially been one experiment for "proving the negative" in case gravitational waves would not exist. However, they turn out to exist, actually.
This goes with the Michelson-Morley Experiment that has been an experiment to prove or not the existence of Aether. As is known, aether is proved not to exist!
By ETI (Encumbrance Theory of Intelligence)
ReplyDeleteI don't deny that (Kantian) Ethical and Moral Character may be directly translated to intelligence rating by actual work and otherwise, ie., the IQ-tests.
By ETI for Sports (Encumbrance Theory of Intelligence)
ReplyDeleteSimilarly, I don't deny that (Kantian) Ethical and Moral Character may be directly translated to sports performance, ceteris paribus.
That is, the sports performance is ideally speaking also a mark of intelligence (and, of course, health).
One is considered encumbered when one is immoral. ETI is meant to emphasise the edge you get in being a moral person. Also see The Good People List under Kantian Ethics and on Facebook.
ReplyDeleteIn fact, the immorality is so utterly wrong that I believe you can die from stupidity, nervous system breakdown, in being one at the extreme end of "category"-schizophrenia.
Under "THE ENCUMBRANCE THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE (ETI)":
ReplyDeleteOn the Reason that Brain Needs Sleep
If we use muscles, they get worn and they stop working after a while. Similarly, the brain may have a similar function that requires it to stop working in that awake fashion thus entering a special mode for sleep.
So, any milk acid in the brain? Or other? What type of substance is extra in the brain in case of sleep deprivation?
Ahhh, relaxing is important!
Cheers!
"On the Reason that Brain Needs Sleep" by #TeamCue
ReplyDeleteMilk acid = Lactic acid
ReplyDeleteWikipedia, Lactic acid: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lactic_acid
Over Atom Brain: just designate an Atom and OR gate test the entire dictionary and more by this very Atom and the Atom talks back at you! #QuantumPhysics @physorg_com #TalkingAtom #AtomBrain #Processor #NatureIsSpeaking @ConservationOrg #Nature
ReplyDeleteFirst to Twitter! @ConservationInt @PhysOrg @@NBCNews @ABC