Monday, 15 July 2013

The Efficiency Argument - Philosophy of Science - Star no. 1 over the 6 Nobel Prizes

Intro: I am happy to present you one of 3 stars over all the 6 Nobel Prizes, including Literature, also as science, and Peace, as Political Science. Economics isn't questioned really for being science, probably mostly referred to with being made up of Mathematics.

Definition of Efficiency (one of them): Accomplishment of or ability to accomplish a job with a minimum expenditure of time and effort. -'Webster's Encyclopedic Unabridged Dictionary from Gramercy.

The solution by The Efficiency Argument is two-sided. It demands the theory to be as slim as possible and that it successfully describes the phenomena in the observation set it is supposed to describe.
In a sense, this gives the right map/"theory" to the right landscape/"phenomena in the observation set", to be blunt.

This work is meant as a criticism insofar I like to shatter the kind of skepticism Feyerabend is promoting, or a complementation, contrast of the book, Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge, I think, of Paul Feyerabend.

I.e.: The whole of science is explainable by the sole use of HDM, hypothetico-deductive-method.


A possible mindset of a beginning: a 'fact' may be something else than a fact, but 'a result' is usually a result of a rational process and is therefore more desirable to obtain than 'a fact'. It is why I would find 'a result' more plausible as an objective to a theory of science rather than 'a fact'. This underpins the continuation that will look at all processes like methods and like everything else in order to make a system of discoveries into processes. The rational processes will in turn make 'facts' into results.

My work will be in the crossfire between Imre Lakatos and Paul Feyerabend where I emphasise HDM and Efficiency with Impact sided with efficiency. It will be something with a touch of foundationalism (inductivism has died).

It's worth noting that The Efficiency Argument solves nicely the tack-on problem in Philosophy of Science because it cuts the theory down to the minimum required to describe the experimental data.

Efficiency goes through the whole row of science: efficient framework/method (HDM, Fallibilism, Falsificationism/Confirmation) which makes efficient theories (minimally complex and sufficient enough to serve the empirical foundation) which in turn effectively describes the observation set of phenomena correctly. In essence, any concept or proposition that's added to the theory in question has to add meaning to the theory's empirical foundation.

The Efficiency Argument entails:
* The Efficiency Argument itself
* Fallibilism
* HDM
* Falsification/Confirmation
* (Possibly Philosophical Investigations by Wittgenstein)
* Significance graphs (by Philip Kitcher)
* The theories themselves
* The process of making these theories


Declaration of the definitive kind, the job has been largely completed and no new literature is required to finish the argument:
There may be minor changes to this list, but none of them will be from literature that's published after 02.02.2010 and the additional information that's written to this title after this date, is also of no crucial importance to making this declaration of what has already been presented here. What has been written under this title up to this date is sufficient itself for making the declaration except this possible, little addition that has been mentioned.

There's no allowance here that relieves you of the need to explain empirical meanings/consequences for example. To describe by minimum requirements doesn't mean that you leave something out of the picture or that you can leave something out of the picture, justifyingly.

I think the realists are well supported by this, being a scientific realist, myself.

When I mention "efficiency" it's for setting focus on possible limits for speculation in shaping (every) theory according to it's empirical foundation and the novel conceptual use/utility. I'm not sure if this explains it properly, but I'm in the beginning of the project (although being at it since 2004).

Additional virtue of this argument is that it allows some metaphysics to be included as long as it serves the cause of scientific efficiency. This has been a problem with other demarcation criteria, famously exemplified by Wittgenstein declaring his work of metaphysical nature to be burnt after having been used. This is no longer a requirement!

It should also be commonplace to remark that reading science should inform you of the latest devlopment and the smartest solution to what you're reading, normatively speaking, insofar the science presented really is science and not a document of history and that the science has been carried out properly in being the current, best science. In effect, you're always rewarded in getting informed and updated on a scientific problem, theoretically, in the science being the latest, newest science.

I don't deny that (1)The Efficiency Argument can't be rephrased as what contributes to science or what has use to science, thus you can think of (2)The Argument of Contribution or (3)The Argument of Use/Utility. These 3 arguments should all be totally equivalent if formulated in the same (somewhat) scope.
Occam's Razor may also be similar to this argument in the sense of Isaac Newton's:
"We are to admit no more causes of natural things than such as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances."

I hereby declare the Demarcation Problem in Philosophy of Science for solved by this, under The Efficiency Argument! Hurray! Fireworks!


By L. F. Olsnes-Lea (formerly Terje Lea)

Note: The guilt of not having finished this lies totally on Norway for obstructing the normal ways to academic performance in my life, rather choosing a despicable, lunatic strategy for seeking influence in suppressing my person, thus making very awful psychological impressions to people and without bothering that this takes place too!

You may want to take note of the word "stratagem", but please add a big deal of idiocy!

Note2: That this makes me look a bit like a fool must be clear, but Norway has chosen "dumb" as virtue for itself and it has forced me to detours and greater delays. File your complaints to Idiot-Norway, please!

----

Additional "technical" information, non-philosophical:
Terje Lea©December, 2004, Terje Lea©February, 2005, Terje Lea©March, 2007, Terje Lea©January, 2010 and Terje Lea©February, 2010.
(The Declaration for the Solution to the Problem of Demarcation in Philosophy of Science has taken place 2nd February, 2010.)
I've added Philip Kitcher's Significance graphs today, 20.02.2011 although it has been added to the writing of the Philosophy Now forum for some time now (since 18.02.2011).

Dates for special sections: 2005-02-25 and 2007-03-05.

3 comments:

  1. Some people may question themselves why I haven't added the references of fx. Karl Popper with The Efficiency Argument and the answer to this is that circumstances haven't allowed me too finish it properly and that this is not a fully developed paper of academic quality yet. No, it's now only "idea and cast" for this very important paper to the World, one that I've "designed the bones" to.

    I can also admit that with Confirmation/HDM (Hypothetico-Deductive-Method)/Scientific Method (compl. entailed by HDM) Objectivity and Replication have been missing from the text in that very pedagogical sense until mentioned now.
    In the meanwhile, you will have to wait some time more, uknown for how long because of a stressful "political" situation, i.e., the lack of access to library and university resources and calmness to get this paper properly grounded.

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  2. Fallibilism (falsifiability) is the strict scientific demand to formulate a theory so that it can be defeated, simply. That there is a kind of theoretical demand to elaborate on a theory to make it clear how it can be imagined to fail given a consideration of the evidence, fx., or an alternative way to opposing theory, maybe given some other finding, let's say, for the time being.

    Falsification on the other hand is about being able to prove, whether proponent to a theory or in opposition to it. Either way, the data-set, method and results are to go through the falsification process to see if they pass as credible/plausible.

    In short,
    Fallibilism: the theoretical ability for a theory to fail, such that one doesn't enter drivel like psudoscience by soothsaying of identifying "your" stars or looking through some tarot cards for yielding revelations to your own life. Very important.

    Again,
    fallibilism: the theoretical possibility for a theory to fail.


    Falsification: isn't so much about the very theory at all, it can be directed toward the results, the method and data-set. Falsification is a far more practical notion than fallibilism, but on the other hand, there are many theorists looking to kill a theory by the fallibilistic attack.

    Again,
    falsification: the inquiry into a theory, first and foremost, by investigating the data-set, the method and the results.
    Therefore, it must be d*mn clear that these two concepts can never be dropped from any complete Demarcation of Science Criterium, holding a set under it, these two ideas included.
    Both Fallibilism and Falsification are ideas by Karl Popper, most splendidly made.

    They are found in Karl Popper's, outside the papers, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson & Co, 1959, pp. 57 - 73.

    (This is a temporary note until finished paper. I must also note you that I'm not able to finish this paper in the ChicagoStyleM yet. This is an absolute stand of mine and that YOU ARE IN NO WAY to object! Understood, please?)

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  3. Other expression:
    Fallibilism is outside the theory as matter of theory strike-field.
    Falsification is inside the theory as matter of theory strike-field, also the slight note on formulating the theory/hypothesis (a bit description) of how the phenomena are to be entailed by the theory/hypothesis.

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