Introduction (to this argument itself) and Argumentation.
This is the case for Cumulativism in the expression of Interconnectedness, Complexity and Technology, (ICT).
It's clear to me that if the Paradigms of Kuhn are supposed to be true, they have to be logically equivalent. I believe Kuhn states that one isn't able to choose rationally any Paradigm, you are more or less drawn into one by all sorts of strange reasons whether they be feelings, social connections or what. You have this Ptolemaic System. Is this supposed to be equivalent to Einstein's Theory of Relativity or Copernicus' Heliocentric Worldview? It's obvious they are not equivalent. It's also obvious the various worldviews hold different cognition based on different assumptions and observations. Let me add the technological development that has made extensions to our eyes, like the Hubble telescope.
It's therefore established that these K. Paradigms are "chosen" or chosen relatively closely temporally. In this, one first problem is to come up with something at all. Each of these are also building on assumptions of concepts, models - theories, and underlying, historical work whether this is mathematics, (naive) remarkable discoveries, development in technology such as telescopes, magnifying glass, general thinking of what reality should be, ie. conceptualisation and speculation. Maybe we get 2 or 3 "Paradigms" to choose from. As these Paradigms are considered, elaborate testing is going on, perhaps coming up with something.
Today, what are our options in choosing from paradigms? We have perhaps these 2 or 3 theories in quantum physics. I sense that scientists are well aware they may be wrong! This means competition is open. We can't certainly begin to doubt observations in space and come up with a different astronomical worldview. We have to say that technology nails something for us. Again I point to advances in other fields that are not actually considered by these scientists in this paradigm.
Conclusion: We have this giant landscape in science (2009) where advances happen all over. Scientists are connected by the internet to exchange agreements, thoughts, and differences of opinion. They are probably expecting new technology and checking for relevant work done elsewhere on Earth and ISS, all-other-wise. There are, I guess, numerous problems in science currently that are being investigated like the dualism of photons and what have you. Then, it's impossible to determine any single paradigm because everything is interconnected and is developed in unison everywhere. It's impossible to make an incision around particular efforts as a consequence. The "community" lives and dies together. Besides, as I see it, today, most disagreements are theoretical and thus not subject to empirical testing. How is Kuhn doing? I think he looks bleak!
Further: In the case of the Paradigm of Einstein's Relativity, shouldn't one acknowledge both Einstein and Riemann on it? As I've pointed out, it's impossible to make a "jump" in time and come up with our science, let's say, 500 years ago or 2500 years ago. This should be blatant and clear! I thereby come up with a second conclusion, that we are in effect "climbing a mountain, science-wise" or "scaling that Babel's tower, science-wise". I think I can say that we know that back in time, people have been more wrong or less objective than we are today, but this may have been necessary! It can't be said definitely, but the scope of the development through history lies there. A new theory of evolution, science-wise?
When I use the word "truth" in connection with paradigm, I mean of course that it's the concept of paradigm that's supposed to be true. I must be crazy if I say that the Ptolemaic worldview is supposed to represent truth, I mean of course, the paradigm.
One of my arguments here is that technology may be the whole engine of cognition and scientific progress. Does it matter to consider paradigms if the Ptolemaians have not had the chance, i.e. aids to see with, the corroboration of observations, to make the cognition that are required to become Copernicans (I may have left out some mathematics here and more). So you seem to have skipped the argument of the technological requirements of scientific progress. If it's technology that makes scientific happen, does it make sense to call it a paradigm? It's obvious that technology represents the inter-subjective.
Can you truly say that our future scientific progress doesn't have a broad inter-subjective, "objective", character in that everyone will recognise the right theory to believe in because it's technology that will decide those beliefs?
So all in all, I think it's better to see science as a whole doing gradual advances in the light of the development of "assumptions of concepts, models - theories, and underlying, historical work whether this is mathematics, (naive) remarkable discoveries, development in technology such as telescopes, magnifying glass, general thinking of what reality should be, i.e. conceptualisation and speculation". All science is broadly based therefore only the scientist-spearheads make the mistakes while cognition of the best alternative is inevitable.
I also note that scientists are well aware they may be wrong! Isn't this counter to Kuhn who is asserting that scientists are blind when they are in a paradigm and that they die with it. Because the scientists die (of old age and whatever) and are those who are driving the paradigms, new paradigms emerge. Is this the case today? I think not. I fail to see that Kuhn is happy with underlying, historical work in explaining his paradigms.
I try to establish cognition as a function of history, especially in the sense of technology with writing "we have to say that technology nails something for us." I believe it's clear that technology isn't subject to paradigms.
A thought strikes that is already implicit. Kuhn can really be accused of crudeness in creating the paradigms because he's ignoring those processes leading to the paradigms in sufficiently thorough terms. Call my assumption contextualism or what you want, but it's derived from "assumptions of concepts, models - theories, and underlying, historical work whether this is mathematics, (naive) remarkable discoveries, development in technology such as telescopes, magnifying glass, general thinking of what reality should be, ie. conceptualisation and speculation". As Kuhn fails to deal with these processes properly, his argument of paradigms is an illusion.
The concept of paradigm is wrong, ie. first question. The science that makes up these "paradigms" is historically false, too, but at that stage in history, that science is still very reasonable. The current science is, of course, the best we have. You know there may be troubles if I use the word "objective".
I say there's definitely cognition in science when the theories are being tested (I don't want to go through the whole HDM and otherwise here) and in the meanwhile that advances in other fields, especially the development of technology, come into play and seal the deal cognitively. You admit that Kuhn makes a point of "strange reasons", but I say that in my argument there are no such "strange reasons" (I don't account for crazy scientists).
I believe Kuhn makes the point that scientists in a paradigm are blind, have no cognition, of advances that competing scientists make. Again, I take it further with technology, it's the technology which is definitely cognitive, that decide the cases where scientific progress can be made.
When I write "paradigms are not true" I intend to say that Kuhn's invention or use of the concept of paradigm in his theory or description of the structure of scientific revolutions is wrong or mistaken or faulty or an illusion. There's no doubt that Kuhn is serious with his book, but this is obvious! Otherwise, I'll do exactly what you have written! Thanks!
Note: Some people may point out that some paradigms happen as a function of "accidents" or unforeseen events. I'm thinking of penicillin or whatever, but I want people to have in mind that these investigative people have been through education and what (Einstein is a Ph.d. when he comes up with the relativity theory, not that it is an accident) and are usually in the process of rigorous research. These people, like Sir Alexander Fleming, are extremely attuned to pick up remarkable events. I don't think any such possible situation is weakening my attack on "paradigms", Kuhn's book. This is so because they are building on that foundation of assumptions that is historically set. I don't deny there are excellent scientists, but they are a part of history, "standing on the shoulders of giants".
I will work on the history of science part. We'll see where it gets. One start may be to draw in as much people as possible into the relativity theory as an example and also make an analysis of assumptions that have proved crucial to Einstein's work.
My point with the technology is simply to emphasise this, it's a blatant truth that some people work on astronomy and some on the substance of glass, i.e. telescopes. In this way, discoveries, the work on theories, in a wide sense, happen in an almost impossibly identifiable manner. So many people are involved in any field of science and continuously so as one field doesn't stop the other in times of less progress.
Copernicus has had a library at his disposal and it leads me to the notion of corroboration of observances. What has been the Ptolemaians' opportunity to systematise and archive their observations? There may be other angles into it. Just this also: Claudius Ptolemaeus, 90 A.D. - 168 A.D. and Nicolaus Copernicus, 19 February 1473 A.D. - 24 May 1543 A.D. Equal pre-conditions?
Along with the point that science, and so technology, is being developed all the time in every field, I think when it comes to the readily applicable technology, it's inter-subjective. The cognitive value of the Hubble telescope is striking. This makes me think that as soon as technology is developed, from that very other field of science, i.e. electronics and what else, that is used in astronomy for example, can decide scientific disputes quite easily. Let's think of x-rays in the case of a broken leg or something thereof. It's bad to say it this way, but I'm in difficulty of finding an outstanding example. I can also point to advances in computing power to the fields of science that can have great use of that.
I have no wish to say there's no theory in technology and that as such, it's just one theory to another. Still, the efforts are obviously broad as theoreticians working with logic in computer-circuits have no idea what the user end is. Similarly, scientists in remote areas may unknowingly work toward a common goal. The other side is that relative transparency in science allows scientists to check for better equipment and "methods" in the interconnectedness. I have the sense that when technology (the host of theories that underlie it) is brought in, one has a clear idea of its utility. (I should perhaps be more cautious here, but I take it from the use of scientific instruments in satellites.) May it be possible to create a giant scientific map of theories in every field and then calculate their upper boundary of discovery? That sounds like some Devil's work. I'm not sure if that's possible to calculate. If you use MRI in some cognitive science, you say that the theory of the MRI limits the cognitive science's aspect in this case, to create theory that is useful? Not only that but this is supposed to be some sort of "self-validation"? I think I disagree (strongly). Let's think of chemistry. If we use some sort of device to analyse chemical compounds, that is a case of self-validation? Even if we agree that the device is calibrated to detect some compound, it's use is not given in determining the world. This should be clear.
There's no chance in identifying one paradigm that isn't affected by the development in the other fields, concrete or abstract. The actual "paradigm" is so fundamentally connected to both the history leading up to this and the contemporary efforts in other fields that it's useless to bother calling it paradigm. There's no explanatory force beyond this particular problem that has gotten stuck and that the other fields of science lack the ability to make it unstuck, progressing. I may be inaccurate with the phases of Kuhn's here. Please, bear with me. However, the point is made.
As progress happens in every field and is thus broad, it's impossible to say which advances in which field will prove crucial to any other field. The applicability of discoveries is not for certain. Yes, I'm definitely looking for a better or simply more comprehensive and interconnected, i.e. different, historiography of science if it's possible to acquire.
This should be said, I rely on the cognitivity of science being worked with and that scientists are able to see the futility or success of their own theory, work. As you have pointed out, back in the old days, this probably has taken a whole lot of time and that people have perished before some decisive event would happen.
I think a "paradigm" in Kuhn's sense is the emergence of an important theory of science that people at that time view as "true", "reliable" or whatever thereof and that it's being worked on and corroborated, perhaps, with the additions of ad-hoc sentences or corrections. The period of the dominance of this theory is this "paradigm".
With the word "cognition" I mean "that which one can grasp or understand with one's mind". It should be fairly common. As for the choice of theory to work with I guess I'm a kind of Popperian, that if the theory one scientist is working with gets bashed, nulled by the work of others, this one scientist is very much able to understand it and shift the efforts to some other theory. Equally I think the opposite is true too. All in all, scientists are able to recognise their own and others' failures or successes in working with theories.
What I'm thinking of when I say that technology is cognitive, is that the results of using this technology definitely are inter-subjective, like looking at some kind of imaging, spectrograph, the rest. That there's no doubt about the utility of this technology.
Let's assume some scientists are working on glass and optics and some other scientists are working on astronomy. Now, the scientists working on glass and optics come up with an improved telescope. The scientists working on astronomy are wondering about the features on the moon or something and use this improved telescope. If the scientists working on astronomy get new knowledge from this, are we then supposed to consider this invalid because "the developments this theory (on the substance of glass and optics, basically mathematics) allows on the "right" theory of the features of the moon and thus that this constitutes "some sort of self-validation"? I must say that this is false! Are we supposed to doubt the mathematics expressed through glass? Can we predict the use of advances in science applied to all of nature? Definitely not!
It's obvious that technology relies on theory, but sometimes it may be a lot more pragmatic than f.x. a theory in astronomy or cosmology. The point is still the interconnectedness in all of science, more or less! As such, these considerations may not be new, but I've yet to see anyone making a good case for it, ie. historiography of science, an actual work published digitally or at least in paper, (multi-volume) book.
Necessarily, my attack on Kuhn includes that scientific revolutions and paradigms are considered pop-culture. The truth is that advances in science are gradual and progressive. At least, the data collected is clearly cumulative and perhaps corrected. It should be exciting to see what levels on can achieve in micro- and macro-scopes in the sciences. My exposition, view of scientific historiography, consists of the three factors, Interconnectedness, Complexity and Technology (ICT). This will make the best explanation of the history of science and defeat Kuhn's theory of "Paradigms".
Concerning the status of paradigms through time, I have to admit that I'm wrong in equalling the paradigms regardless of time. Let me quote Kuhn from SSR, 3rd ed., chapter 9, p. 96: wrote:
Quote: "...After the pre-paradigm period the assimilation of all new theories and of almost all new sorts of phenomena has in fact demanded the destruction of a prior paradigm and a consequent conflict between competing schools of scientific thought..."
If I find more of these instances I'll quote them too.
The amount of data is in every matter considered independently of "paradigm" or phase of history of science you're in. If our perception of gravity changes significantly, it's no more gravity. It's something else. That is, it's the data that guide us in making appropriate concepts and descriptions. This may be seen as causal, but I think it represents something else. The word "gravitare" means to attract or so and it fits nicely the observation we have of seeing things fall to the ground. It sounds basic and I'll try to look for a better example or two.
From SSR 3rd ed. p. 96 about Normal science and cumulation:
Quote: "Normal research [as opposed to outside the specific paradigm], which is cumulative, owes its success to the ability of scientists regularly to select problems..."
I think Kuhn mentions a number of times that in his theory, Normal science is cumulative. This is opposed to my view that science is overall cumulative in the data gathering.
As such, if it's only "normal science" that is cumulative then it should be indeed possible to claim that "paradigms" are equal in standing because previous gathering of sense-data and speculation are obsolete in Kuhn's language. This is abruptly wrong in my opinion. One only needs to look to the steady progress of technology to get a clue of this. Not only that, but I've made it a main point that science very much interacts with technology. Technology is, as we all know, just a different expression of science that is worked out in other fields than where it's applied, typically in the scientific experiments in this regard and usually decisively so.
Are the data thrown out? No! In the experiments that are taken to support the Caloric-theory, there are inaccuracies. These inaccuracies lead to misinterpretations and to the faulty conclusion. I think, if we carry out the experiments today in the same way they have been then, we should get the same data as in the past. Obviously, we look at those data very differently now than back then. We are probably able to identify where they have gone wrong and how the set of data may be corrupt or at least inaccurate. At times, I find that Kuhn isn't separating between the generation of experimental data and the inferred theories thereof. Rather the correct view should be that all sorts of experiments generate a data bank of past experience. If the experiments have been carried out correctly in the past with that technology and accuracy of the time then it's just to repeat them and we get the same data over again. Past experiments are inter-subjective or objective within the boundary of what they have available at that time. We continually use this history to position ourselves for the future, not to repeat ourselves.
Concerning the Ptolemy astronomy versus the Copernican astronomy. There are still these factors that may have contributed to the progress possible. One should have in mind that this is a period of 1300 years:
1. Increasing number of astronomers and people contributing to astronomy.
2. The formalisation of specific educational training of astronomers.
3. Increasing observation gathering incl. increasing documentation of observations, perhaps also more accurate.
4. The printing press is developed some 150 years ahead of Copernicus, further making his library of astronomy actual. There's also the development of writing equipment and the quality of paper itself.
There you have it. Has this been included in the account made by Kuhn? Not that I know of.
It says in "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" p. 17, Philosophy of Science - The Central Issues by M. Curd and J. A. Cover, "On some occasions, at least, tests are not requisite to the revolutions through which science advances. But that is not true of puzzles."
Kuhn makes a point in "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" implying that puzzle solving promotes science better than Popper's testing of hypotheses, but when Kuhn does this, he forgets that the actual astronomical observations can be tested against the explanation that best fits the picture of the set of observations. This is actually the case with the anomaly of Newton's system where the perihelion of Mercury has been out of line. The anomaly has been bothering astronomers all the time up to Einstein's Theory of Relativity. This is written on p. 85 of Donald Gillies' book, Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century.
This may be some of the reason why my criticism of Kuhn has been made possible. He has devoted himself in too great a degree to linguistic constructs and less to the objective facts concerning the actual scientific observations that in a sense represent Scientific Realism. This can partly explain his motivation to hold the Theory of Paradigms even if it's in fact been written appx. 8 years after 1. ed. of "The Structure".
Further: I've been reading Kuhn some more and I find this striking statement: Kuhn, SSR, p. x, Preface write: Quote: "Though subsequent events have somewhat relaxed those restrictions and have made possible simultaneous independent publication, this work remains an essay rather than the full-scale book my subject will ultimately demand." It's quite astonishing that the followers of Kuhn call his work definitive when he surely haven't bothered to finish it. This is written in February 1962 and Kuhn lives to 1996. It looks sloppy by Kuhn. I wonder how many excuses that are going to be made on the grounds that the book is unfinished. It makes me think of an analogy with the religious character of Jesus who can be said to be more holes than substance. At least, everyone can now see how the Complexity part falls into my pocket.
To make the distinction fully between Kuhn and myself and why my description has more use than Kuhn's, beside being true, is that with my theory of ICT it should be possible to determine the careful steps that lead to a successful theory in a complex picture of historiography of science rather than the very crude image given by Kuhn and his incomplete work, by his own words, of The Structure!
Preliminary notes follow.------------------------------
Kuhn, SSR, p. 4, writes:
Quote: "Nor does it make less consequential the particular constellation to which the group, at a given time, is in fact committed."
The sense of mine is here that Kuhn seems to incorporate this into his beginning paradigm of normal science where the alleged puzzle solving takes place in order to reveal anomalies to theory as science is developed. I like to draw a comparison to ancient Greek history and suggest that its scope certainly entails Einstein's work. What does this mean? I point out that one is dedicated to the best no matter what one's situation is. Therefore, I think, it's equally good to suggest that one is attacking the current theory as much as one is making confirmations to it. The message is that the observations are calling for the theory's future, whether one is "friendly" or "hostile" to it. It's my impression that Kuhn puts a great deal of theory-laden observations into his foundation of SSR, (clearly) to the extent that he blurs out the distinction between (experimental) observations and theory that's tested. As one knows, the theory is supposed to be defined in a way that makes testing possible, otherwise the experiment is useless or not an experiment at all. Does this mean that the ancient Greek have been committed to anything less than to the best of their ability? No, because they at that time needed more observations and the appropriate observations. Those, as we all know, haven't been achieved or developed, especially technically, before much later.
------------------------------
Some further writings of various kind.
I've been reading the article, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?", before SSR has arrived from the bookstore. It's funny why Kuhn bothers to reiterate his puzzle solving and compare it against Popper's testing of hypothesis. It should be clear what Kuhn says before bothering to say that his view opposes Popper's.
It turns out that puzzle solving is formulated in ch. 4 of SSR. The very chapter is named "Normal Science as Puzzle-Solving".
Missing pieces in physics! Missing pieces in the other fields of science! So, the question is, are we in crisis in Particle Physics according to Kuhn? We have currently a situation akin to the one in Newtonian physics where the anomaly of the perihelion of Mercury is known.
What I'm thinking of when I say that technology is cognitive, is that the results of using this technology definitely are inter-subjective, like looking at some kind of imaging, spectrograph, the rest. That there's no doubt about the utility of this technology.
Let's assume some scientists are working on glass and optics and some other scientists are working on astronomy. Now, the scientists working on glass and optics come up with an improved telescope. The scientists working on astronomy are wondering about the features on the moon or something and use this improved telescope. If the scientists working on astronomy get new knowledge from this, are we then supposed to consider this invalid because "the developments this theory (on the substance of glass and optics, basically mathematics) allows on the "right" theory of the features of the moon and thus that this constitutes "some sort of self-validation"? I must say that this is false! Are we supposed to doubt the mathematics expressed through glass? Can we predict the use of advances in science applied to all of nature? Definitely not!
It's obvious that technology relies on theory, but sometimes it may be a lot more pragmatic than f.x. a theory in astronomy or cosmology. The point is still the interconnectedness in all of science, more or less! As such, these considerations may not be new, but I've yet to see anyone making a good case for it, ie. historiography of science, an actual work published digitally or at least in paper, (multi-volume) book.
Necessarily, my attack on Kuhn includes that scientific revolutions and paradigms are considered pop-culture. The truth is that advances in science are gradual and progressive. At least, the data collected is clearly cumulative and perhaps corrected. It should be exciting to see what levels on can achieve in micro- and macro-scopes in the sciences. My exposition, view of scientific historiography, consists of the three factors, Interconnectedness, Complexity and Technology (ICT). This will make the best explanation of the history of science and defeat Kuhn's theory of "Paradigms".
Concerning the status of paradigms through time, I have to admit that I'm wrong in equalling the paradigms regardless of time. Let me quote Kuhn from SSR, 3rd ed., chapter 9, p. 96: wrote:
Quote: "...After the pre-paradigm period the assimilation of all new theories and of almost all new sorts of phenomena has in fact demanded the destruction of a prior paradigm and a consequent conflict between competing schools of scientific thought..."
If I find more of these instances I'll quote them too.
The amount of data is in every matter considered independently of "paradigm" or phase of history of science you're in. If our perception of gravity changes significantly, it's no more gravity. It's something else. That is, it's the data that guide us in making appropriate concepts and descriptions. This may be seen as causal, but I think it represents something else. The word "gravitare" means to attract or so and it fits nicely the observation we have of seeing things fall to the ground. It sounds basic and I'll try to look for a better example or two.
From SSR 3rd ed. p. 96 about Normal science and cumulation:
Quote: "Normal research [as opposed to outside the specific paradigm], which is cumulative, owes its success to the ability of scientists regularly to select problems..."
I think Kuhn mentions a number of times that in his theory, Normal science is cumulative. This is opposed to my view that science is overall cumulative in the data gathering.
As such, if it's only "normal science" that is cumulative then it should be indeed possible to claim that "paradigms" are equal in standing because previous gathering of sense-data and speculation are obsolete in Kuhn's language. This is abruptly wrong in my opinion. One only needs to look to the steady progress of technology to get a clue of this. Not only that, but I've made it a main point that science very much interacts with technology. Technology is, as we all know, just a different expression of science that is worked out in other fields than where it's applied, typically in the scientific experiments in this regard and usually decisively so.
Are the data thrown out? No! In the experiments that are taken to support the Caloric-theory, there are inaccuracies. These inaccuracies lead to misinterpretations and to the faulty conclusion. I think, if we carry out the experiments today in the same way they have been then, we should get the same data as in the past. Obviously, we look at those data very differently now than back then. We are probably able to identify where they have gone wrong and how the set of data may be corrupt or at least inaccurate. At times, I find that Kuhn isn't separating between the generation of experimental data and the inferred theories thereof. Rather the correct view should be that all sorts of experiments generate a data bank of past experience. If the experiments have been carried out correctly in the past with that technology and accuracy of the time then it's just to repeat them and we get the same data over again. Past experiments are inter-subjective or objective within the boundary of what they have available at that time. We continually use this history to position ourselves for the future, not to repeat ourselves.
Concerning the Ptolemy astronomy versus the Copernican astronomy. There are still these factors that may have contributed to the progress possible. One should have in mind that this is a period of 1300 years:
1. Increasing number of astronomers and people contributing to astronomy.
2. The formalisation of specific educational training of astronomers.
3. Increasing observation gathering incl. increasing documentation of observations, perhaps also more accurate.
4. The printing press is developed some 150 years ahead of Copernicus, further making his library of astronomy actual. There's also the development of writing equipment and the quality of paper itself.
There you have it. Has this been included in the account made by Kuhn? Not that I know of.
It says in "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" p. 17, Philosophy of Science - The Central Issues by M. Curd and J. A. Cover, "On some occasions, at least, tests are not requisite to the revolutions through which science advances. But that is not true of puzzles."
Kuhn makes a point in "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?" implying that puzzle solving promotes science better than Popper's testing of hypotheses, but when Kuhn does this, he forgets that the actual astronomical observations can be tested against the explanation that best fits the picture of the set of observations. This is actually the case with the anomaly of Newton's system where the perihelion of Mercury has been out of line. The anomaly has been bothering astronomers all the time up to Einstein's Theory of Relativity. This is written on p. 85 of Donald Gillies' book, Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century.
This may be some of the reason why my criticism of Kuhn has been made possible. He has devoted himself in too great a degree to linguistic constructs and less to the objective facts concerning the actual scientific observations that in a sense represent Scientific Realism. This can partly explain his motivation to hold the Theory of Paradigms even if it's in fact been written appx. 8 years after 1. ed. of "The Structure".
Further: I've been reading Kuhn some more and I find this striking statement: Kuhn, SSR, p. x, Preface write: Quote: "Though subsequent events have somewhat relaxed those restrictions and have made possible simultaneous independent publication, this work remains an essay rather than the full-scale book my subject will ultimately demand." It's quite astonishing that the followers of Kuhn call his work definitive when he surely haven't bothered to finish it. This is written in February 1962 and Kuhn lives to 1996. It looks sloppy by Kuhn. I wonder how many excuses that are going to be made on the grounds that the book is unfinished. It makes me think of an analogy with the religious character of Jesus who can be said to be more holes than substance. At least, everyone can now see how the Complexity part falls into my pocket.
To make the distinction fully between Kuhn and myself and why my description has more use than Kuhn's, beside being true, is that with my theory of ICT it should be possible to determine the careful steps that lead to a successful theory in a complex picture of historiography of science rather than the very crude image given by Kuhn and his incomplete work, by his own words, of The Structure!
Preliminary notes follow.------------------------------
Kuhn, SSR, p. 4, writes:
Quote: "Nor does it make less consequential the particular constellation to which the group, at a given time, is in fact committed."
The sense of mine is here that Kuhn seems to incorporate this into his beginning paradigm of normal science where the alleged puzzle solving takes place in order to reveal anomalies to theory as science is developed. I like to draw a comparison to ancient Greek history and suggest that its scope certainly entails Einstein's work. What does this mean? I point out that one is dedicated to the best no matter what one's situation is. Therefore, I think, it's equally good to suggest that one is attacking the current theory as much as one is making confirmations to it. The message is that the observations are calling for the theory's future, whether one is "friendly" or "hostile" to it. It's my impression that Kuhn puts a great deal of theory-laden observations into his foundation of SSR, (clearly) to the extent that he blurs out the distinction between (experimental) observations and theory that's tested. As one knows, the theory is supposed to be defined in a way that makes testing possible, otherwise the experiment is useless or not an experiment at all. Does this mean that the ancient Greek have been committed to anything less than to the best of their ability? No, because they at that time needed more observations and the appropriate observations. Those, as we all know, haven't been achieved or developed, especially technically, before much later.
------------------------------
Some further writings of various kind.
I've been reading the article, "Logic of Discovery or Psychology of Research?", before SSR has arrived from the bookstore. It's funny why Kuhn bothers to reiterate his puzzle solving and compare it against Popper's testing of hypothesis. It should be clear what Kuhn says before bothering to say that his view opposes Popper's.
It turns out that puzzle solving is formulated in ch. 4 of SSR. The very chapter is named "Normal Science as Puzzle-Solving".
Missing pieces in physics! Missing pieces in the other fields of science! So, the question is, are we in crisis in Particle Physics according to Kuhn? We have currently a situation akin to the one in Newtonian physics where the anomaly of the perihelion of Mercury is known.
This also comes together with our ability to make observations without being dependent on theory or without fusing our theories with our observations. I think we are just forced to carry on with scientific investigations regardless of what Kuhn's analysis tells us and, at the same time, without being blind while doing so.
------------------------------
I just like to add, having learnt of Ian Hacking's "Interactive Kinds", that it may be just as an effective term to describe the history of science as my "Interconnectedness, Complexity and Technology (ICT)". Also, "interactive kinds" reinforces "natural kinds" beautifully!
Therefore, you may already now want to begin to read Ian Hacking and make your own Cumulativist version of it!
------------------------------
I'm wondering about writing about the "paradigm" of the microscope to crush the notion of paradigm because the microscope (or the telescope) extends so beautifully from our natural observing capacity and through relatively plausible optics mechanisms. Eventually I hope this is to happen, the crushing of the notion of paradigm, nevertheless.
It can be worth noting the preceding history to the laboratory and why one has decided to use laboratories in the first place. Because Kuhn is explicitly unable or not willing to separate theory and necessary experiment apparatus for making the case of the theory. Thus, experiment apparatus is not some arbitrary "black magic" device, but maybe in the Kuhnian sense, charicaturely!
What other choice is there? There are indeed deep limitations to being a human being, thus we need the microscope, the LHC, the other particle accelerators, the SOHO satelite, the spectrometer and the rest!
It maybe unnecessary to say that this writing or outlining will be a total crash with "The Structure" even if his "Structure" in many senses is well told and expertly composed.
------------------------------
(I write forthcoming on quotes from SSR until I've finished reading it.)
Case studies by ICT. (Upcoming!)------------------------------
The two cases I've decided on are "Einstein and the possible contestants" and "Lavoisier and the Caloric theory of heat". I may add more cases than this, but nominally these are the two cases I desire to investigate. I think these two cases also provide enough workload and they are also sufficient to provide credibility of ICT if the work is done properly. This is just a notice to interested readers and it is going to be removed as the case studies are played out.
By L. F. Olsnes-Lea (formerly Terje Lea)
Note: The guilt of not having finished this lies totally on Norway for obstructing the normal ways to academic performance in my life, rather choosing a despicable, lunatic strategy for seeking influence in suppressing my person, thus making very awful psychological impressions to people and without bothering that this takes place too!
You may want to take note of the word "stratagem", but please add a big deal of idiocy!
Note2: That this makes me look a bit like a fool must be clear, but Norway has chosen "dumb" as virtue for itself and it has forced me to detours and greater delays. File your complaints to Idiot-Norway, please!
----
Declaration: This star of mine, rightfully, lies in my pocket! (No more stupid words, please!)
Just as an example:
Thomas Kuhn = "normal science", a special concept of his, p. 24.
Me, [Leonardo] F. Olsnes-Lea = "only normal science",
- normal science is what I insist on and that I declare all science to be, and not a step outside research ethics either.
I do not need to explain the Nobel Organisation (or a committee, over all the 6 prizes) how important this is to science. They should know my name very well by now and that they can rather read the finished paper from my hand or close to me later.
End note for legal status, by Norway-behaviour, all in all, country-wise:
As Norway has made a new rule for "valid human beings" out just a minute ago, I still miss my 30 million letters and packages and more from Postal Services Norway (Posten Norge) so, please, don't send me letters.
Thomas Kuhn has claimed that there is no principal difference between voodoo and science in works after his famous "essay", Structure of Scientific Revolutions. James Randi is probably against this (now). This is at least noted in a Norwegian book by UiO, Jo Sivertsen, "Vitenskap og rasjonalitet".
I am directly against this and his book, "Structure of Scientific Revolutions"!
The followers to Kuhn are therefore required to deliver this "scientific" voodoo film evidence to somewhere credible for evaluation BY ALL! Hah-hah-hah-hah.
The names for our plotting in finishing the ICT by one example against the SSR of T. Kuhn:
Ptolemyan (Ptolemy, ca. 90 - 168 CE) - Copernican (Copernicus, 1473 - 1543 CE) - Brahean (Brahe, 1546 - 1601 CE) - Galileoean (Galileo, 1564 - 1642 CE) - Keplerian (Kepler, 1571 - 1630 CE) - Newtonian (Newton, 1642 - 1727 CE) - Einsteinian (Einstein, 1879 - 1955 CE).
Despite some disagreements between the 3 above, with Galileo already being credibly more forceful then, decided by Copernicus(?, fraud on the internet?)/Newton! (Let me come back to this point.)
And not Krausses 1000s of religions either!
Then its for us to plot the names ourselves by time and number of observations graph, inside the x, y-axes of time and number and with a bit of "printing press"-time dot under the y-axis! The SSR (The Structure) seems ever smaller? Not comparable texts as theories by the 7 scientists above?
Note: This is one account for one data-set under MY standard (the bl**dy hardest, blog language) for Historiography of Science. Also, it is well known with us, the philosophers of science, that the data-set stretches all the way back to ancient China and one observation of Haley's Comet or whatever (need check of non-fake book not under corrupt Norway). The set is also, of course, being updated today and in the future as well, I think it's fair to say.
Note2: This comes in also after trying to identify the part where Thomas Kuhn describes this universal machine of science where he claims he can put anything in and get anything out in principle (requiring the text of a non-fake book not under corrupt Norway).
Retrying:
Despite some disagreements between the 3 above, with Galileo already being credibly more forceful then, decided by Newton, not entirely recalling the comparison of theories between them!
As I've been looking into the book, SSR/the Structure of Kuhn more, I'll make this short for the readers already now so that no "excess"/"waste of time" reading or effort is required:
The text is found on p. 76 and reads, "...that more than one theoretical construction can always be placed upon a given collection of data."
First, my point of view is that very few (understating 1, reasonably) such "constructions" can be achieved whatsoever if they are to be 1. incompatible and 2. differ significantly.
A formal note goes to the theories (with the data-sets) which are failures simply because they are theoretically too many and too insignificant to consider.
That is, these "constructions" will never differ in ways that are outside the best achievable theory (and data-set) and that the "constructions" will have little or no impact in the scientific World and much of it is probably made by "I-defy-you"-philosophers of science either way and look terribly artificial and desperate too.
This point is regarded as crucial in considering my opposition to Kuhn in providing the best Philosophy of Science, allowing me a much more refined account of History of Science by ICT. The rest of Kuhn's book (210 pages) is read in my light onto Kuhn by my interpretation of these "constructions", being a kind of general phrase for the science that Kuhn represents in this book and after.
If two lessons can be drawn from history of science, they are these: accuracy and added description. Not scientific revolutions, not cognitively new worlds!
The telescopes of history can be viewed in combination by the focusing telescope that's able to go from the view of the naked eye to the starry heavens and zooming in on a given bit of astronomical sky! Thereby you go from the weakest telescopes in history, meaning the earliest, to the most powerful telescopes in history, meaning the somewhat latest.
Please also see the improved historiography on astronomy in comparing this work of mine to Kuhn's SSR:
https://whatiswritten777.blogspot.no/2017/01/case-in-point-astronomy-against-kuhns.html
---------------------
Swinging stone in ancient Greece vs. pendulum in renaissance Italy
Relating to Aristotle and Galileo by Kuhn and SSR, p. 118 - 125 and the difference of a swinging stone and the pendulum.
Aristotle: 384 BC - 322 BC, seeing a swinging stone, I guess, by chain or thread.
Galileo: 15 February 1564 - 8 January 1642, seeing the pendulum.
The difference between them: roughly 2000 yrs.
So, by Cumulativism, if we have 2000 years between 2 people and suppose a "revolution" as Galileo considers the pendulum I'd like people to think again because that's 2000 years of engineering history as well.
Let's list some factors for these 2000 years of engineering history:
* Measurements - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_measurement
* Accuracy and precision - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accuracy_and_precision
* Technological ability to manipulate objects (i.e., tools and more) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tool - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renaissance (for "simple machines")
So it proceeds from the factors above that a "revolution" hardly can be noted over the course of 2000 entire years and with the advance of the factors above.
Orderly: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pendulum.
Aristotle: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle
Galileo: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galileo_Galilei
Additional "technical" information, non-philosophical:
By Terje Lea, September, 2009, November, 2009, December, 2009, February, 2010, March, 2010, June, 2010 and February, 2011 and so on until 2017 (today).
Note: this last comment added, 04.02.2011, has first been written on the Philosophy Now.
------------------------------
I just like to add, having learnt of Ian Hacking's "Interactive Kinds", that it may be just as an effective term to describe the history of science as my "Interconnectedness, Complexity and Technology (ICT)". Also, "interactive kinds" reinforces "natural kinds" beautifully!
Therefore, you may already now want to begin to read Ian Hacking and make your own Cumulativist version of it!
------------------------------
I'm wondering about writing about the "paradigm" of the microscope to crush the notion of paradigm because the microscope (or the telescope) extends so beautifully from our natural observing capacity and through relatively plausible optics mechanisms. Eventually I hope this is to happen, the crushing of the notion of paradigm, nevertheless.
It can be worth noting the preceding history to the laboratory and why one has decided to use laboratories in the first place. Because Kuhn is explicitly unable or not willing to separate theory and necessary experiment apparatus for making the case of the theory. Thus, experiment apparatus is not some arbitrary "black magic" device, but maybe in the Kuhnian sense, charicaturely!
What other choice is there? There are indeed deep limitations to being a human being, thus we need the microscope, the LHC, the other particle accelerators, the SOHO satelite, the spectrometer and the rest!
It maybe unnecessary to say that this writing or outlining will be a total crash with "The Structure" even if his "Structure" in many senses is well told and expertly composed.
------------------------------
(I write forthcoming on quotes from SSR until I've finished reading it.)
Case studies by ICT. (Upcoming!)------------------------------
The two cases I've decided on are "Einstein and the possible contestants" and "Lavoisier and the Caloric theory of heat". I may add more cases than this, but nominally these are the two cases I desire to investigate. I think these two cases also provide enough workload and they are also sufficient to provide credibility of ICT if the work is done properly. This is just a notice to interested readers and it is going to be removed as the case studies are played out.
By L. F. Olsnes-Lea (formerly Terje Lea)
Note: The guilt of not having finished this lies totally on Norway for obstructing the normal ways to academic performance in my life, rather choosing a despicable, lunatic strategy for seeking influence in suppressing my person, thus making very awful psychological impressions to people and without bothering that this takes place too!
You may want to take note of the word "stratagem", but please add a big deal of idiocy!
Note2: That this makes me look a bit like a fool must be clear, but Norway has chosen "dumb" as virtue for itself and it has forced me to detours and greater delays. File your complaints to Idiot-Norway, please!
----
Declaration: This star of mine, rightfully, lies in my pocket! (No more stupid words, please!)
Just as an example:
Thomas Kuhn = "normal science", a special concept of his, p. 24.
Me, [Leonardo] F. Olsnes-Lea = "only normal science",
- normal science is what I insist on and that I declare all science to be, and not a step outside research ethics either.
I do not need to explain the Nobel Organisation (or a committee, over all the 6 prizes) how important this is to science. They should know my name very well by now and that they can rather read the finished paper from my hand or close to me later.
End note for legal status, by Norway-behaviour, all in all, country-wise:
As Norway has made a new rule for "valid human beings" out just a minute ago, I still miss my 30 million letters and packages and more from Postal Services Norway (Posten Norge) so, please, don't send me letters.
Thomas Kuhn has claimed that there is no principal difference between voodoo and science in works after his famous "essay", Structure of Scientific Revolutions. James Randi is probably against this (now). This is at least noted in a Norwegian book by UiO, Jo Sivertsen, "Vitenskap og rasjonalitet".
I am directly against this and his book, "Structure of Scientific Revolutions"!
The followers to Kuhn are therefore required to deliver this "scientific" voodoo film evidence to somewhere credible for evaluation BY ALL! Hah-hah-hah-hah.
The names for our plotting in finishing the ICT by one example against the SSR of T. Kuhn:
Ptolemyan (Ptolemy, ca. 90 - 168 CE) - Copernican (Copernicus, 1473 - 1543 CE) - Brahean (Brahe, 1546 - 1601 CE) - Galileoean (Galileo, 1564 - 1642 CE) - Keplerian (Kepler, 1571 - 1630 CE) - Newtonian (Newton, 1642 - 1727 CE) - Einsteinian (Einstein, 1879 - 1955 CE).
Despite some disagreements between the 3 above, with Galileo already being credibly more forceful then, decided by Copernicus(?, fraud on the internet?)/Newton! (Let me come back to this point.)
And not Krausses 1000s of religions either!
Then its for us to plot the names ourselves by time and number of observations graph, inside the x, y-axes of time and number and with a bit of "printing press"-time dot under the y-axis! The SSR (The Structure) seems ever smaller? Not comparable texts as theories by the 7 scientists above?
Note: This is one account for one data-set under MY standard (the bl**dy hardest, blog language) for Historiography of Science. Also, it is well known with us, the philosophers of science, that the data-set stretches all the way back to ancient China and one observation of Haley's Comet or whatever (need check of non-fake book not under corrupt Norway). The set is also, of course, being updated today and in the future as well, I think it's fair to say.
Note2: This comes in also after trying to identify the part where Thomas Kuhn describes this universal machine of science where he claims he can put anything in and get anything out in principle (requiring the text of a non-fake book not under corrupt Norway).
Retrying:
Despite some disagreements between the 3 above, with Galileo already being credibly more forceful then, decided by Newton, not entirely recalling the comparison of theories between them!
As I've been looking into the book, SSR/the Structure of Kuhn more, I'll make this short for the readers already now so that no "excess"/"waste of time" reading or effort is required:
The text is found on p. 76 and reads, "...that more than one theoretical construction can always be placed upon a given collection of data."
First, my point of view is that very few (understating 1, reasonably) such "constructions" can be achieved whatsoever if they are to be 1. incompatible and 2. differ significantly.
A formal note goes to the theories (with the data-sets) which are failures simply because they are theoretically too many and too insignificant to consider.
That is, these "constructions" will never differ in ways that are outside the best achievable theory (and data-set) and that the "constructions" will have little or no impact in the scientific World and much of it is probably made by "I-defy-you"-philosophers of science either way and look terribly artificial and desperate too.
This point is regarded as crucial in considering my opposition to Kuhn in providing the best Philosophy of Science, allowing me a much more refined account of History of Science by ICT. The rest of Kuhn's book (210 pages) is read in my light onto Kuhn by my interpretation of these "constructions", being a kind of general phrase for the science that Kuhn represents in this book and after.
If two lessons can be drawn from history of science, they are these: accuracy and added description. Not scientific revolutions, not cognitively new worlds!
The telescopes of history can be viewed in combination by the focusing telescope that's able to go from the view of the naked eye to the starry heavens and zooming in on a given bit of astronomical sky! Thereby you go from the weakest telescopes in history, meaning the earliest, to the most powerful telescopes in history, meaning the somewhat latest.
Please also see the improved historiography on astronomy in comparing this work of mine to Kuhn's SSR:
https://whatiswritten777.blogspot.no/2017/01/case-in-point-astronomy-against-kuhns.html
---------------------
Swinging stone in ancient Greece vs. pendulum in renaissance Italy
Relating to Aristotle and Galileo by Kuhn and SSR, p. 118 - 125 and the difference of a swinging stone and the pendulum.
Aristotle: 384 BC - 322 BC, seeing a swinging stone, I guess, by chain or thread.
Galileo: 15 February 1564 - 8 January 1642, seeing the pendulum.
The difference between them: roughly 2000 yrs.
So, by Cumulativism, if we have 2000 years between 2 people and suppose a "revolution" as Galileo considers the pendulum I'd like people to think again because that's 2000 years of engineering history as well.
Let's list some factors for these 2000 years of engineering history:
* Measurements - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_measurement
* Accuracy and precision - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accuracy_and_precision
* Technological ability to manipulate objects (i.e., tools and more) - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Technology - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tool - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Renaissance (for "simple machines")
So it proceeds from the factors above that a "revolution" hardly can be noted over the course of 2000 entire years and with the advance of the factors above.
Orderly: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pendulum.
Aristotle: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristotle
Galileo: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Galileo_Galilei
---------------------
Additional "technical" information, non-philosophical:
By Terje Lea, September, 2009, November, 2009, December, 2009, February, 2010, March, 2010, June, 2010 and February, 2011 and so on until 2017 (today).
Note: this last comment added, 04.02.2011, has first been written on the Philosophy Now.
